First Do No Harm

We all know that part of the Hippocratic Oath of medical practitioners includes the promise to “first do no harm”. We also know of many drugs used to effectively treat various maladies were later taken off the market because of detrimental side-effects. We expect drug companies to research the side-effects of any drugs before they are widely used on humans. Do practitioners in the people “rehabilitation” business concern themselves with potential side effects and risks of the treatment they prescribe? The answer is not usually.

In an interesting article, “Cures that Harm: Unanticipated Outcomes of Crime Prevention Programs”, researcher Joan McCord argues that evaluating programs that attempt to reduce crime for effectiveness alone, is insufficient as some treatments cause other harm—sometimes even when they are effective in reducing recidivism.[i] McCord states: “Unless social programs are evaluated for potential harm as well as benefit, safety as well as efficacy, the choice of which social programs to use will remain a dangerous guess.” She continues, “Reluctance to recognize that good intentions can result in harm can be found in biased investigating and reporting. Many investigators fail to ask whether an intervention has had adverse effects, and many research summaries lack systematic reporting of such effects.”[ii]

McCord describes several well-designed, carefully implemented studies that resulted in harmful side-effects. The first was the Cambridge-Sommerville Youth Study, which “was a carefully designed, adequately funded, and well-executed intervention program.”[iii] That study was based on the theory that criminal conduct was related to the family in which the person grew-up. In the treatment homes, a social worker visited the family, sometimes once each week, providing friendly guidance for the children and family including referring the children to needed specialists. The control homes were identical to the treatment homes, but did not receive the treatment. All program participants reported that they thought the program had a very positive effect on them.[iv]

McCord followed these children for about 35 to 40 years. Her results showed that those children who were in the program, as adults, were more likely to have been convicted of a crime. She ultimately isolated the one factor, multiple attendance at summer camp, that increased the odds of a child being convicted of a crime as an adult by a factor of ten.[v] McCord applauds this study as having been designed properly from the start with an appropriate control group to allow researchers to discern the effects of the treatment.[vi]

McCord discusses another well-thought out and well-designed program that resulted in harm called “Volunteers in Probation”. In this program juvenile delinquents were assigned a volunteer who provided tutoring services for the youth. The program participants committed more crimes than the control group. The evaluator of that program wrote:

“To those who may feel that other such programs, perhaps their own, are so much superior or so different from this program and that our findings and recommendations are irrelevant to them, we urge caution. The staff responsible for this program has reasons good enough for them to feel that their program was effective when this study began, and without this study might still have no reason to feel otherwise. If there is anything that such a study as this one demonstrates, it is the danger of relying exclusively on faith in good works in the absences of systematic data”. [vii]

McCord discusses other programs designed to reduce criminal recidivism rates that ultimate turned out to increase them. One of these programs was the “Scared Straight” program where juvenile delinquents were exposed to tough prison inmates in an attempt to scare the delinquents into becoming law abiding. The program resulted in an increase in criminal activity for those who participated in the program. It was opined that the juveniles committed more crimes to prove that they were not scared. [viii]

Another actual side-effect case, not related to program efficacy, involved the use of citizen volunteers visiting with prisoners in an attempt to change the prisoners’ anti-social thinking by interacting with and learning from volunteers who had pro-social thinking. An evaluation of the program showed that it was effective in reducing prisoners’ antisocial thinking. However, this program had a negative side-effect. The researchers found that the citizen volunteers had increased antisocial thinking. Although the prisoners were learning from the volunteers, the volunteers were also learning from the prisoners.[ix]

McCord concludes that studies which provide evidence of harmful effects are often not published as there is a strong bias against reporting adverse effects of social programs. How often do we hear someone discussing a program that they found probably didn’t work? Rarely, if ever, do we hear of negative results.

McCord writes:

“ Many people seem to be willing to believe favorable results of inadequate evaluation designs. Some accept testimonials from clients who express their appreciation of a program. Against the claim that these provide valid evidence of effect, it should be noted that each of the programs (that she describes) would have been counted as successful by this criterion. Yet the clients would have better off had they not participated in the program.”

Those of us in the people rehabilitation business are advised to keep the admonitions of “first do no harm” and “the path to hell is paved with good intentions” in mind when we embark on a new idea to reform peoples’ behaviors. While it is important to not throw our hands up in despair and falsely claim that “nothing works”, we should always be realistic, guided by sound theory and ultimately empirical research, to ensure what we do, does not result in harm to the program participants, their families, and society.

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[i] McCord, Joan (2003), Cures that Harm: Unanticipated Outcomes of Crime Prevention Programs, 587 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science pp 16-29.

[ii] Ibid, p. 17.

[iii] Ibid p. 17.

[iv] Ibid pp 18-23.

[v] Ibid. pp. 21-22.

[vi] Ibid. pp. 23.

[vii] Ibid. p. 24, quoting Berger, R.J. et al, 1975, Experiment in a juvenile court: A study of a program of volunteers working with juvenile probationers. Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan

[viii] Ibid. p. 26.

[ix] Andrews, D.A and James Bonta, 2010, The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 5^th Ed. New Jersey, Mathew Bender, P. 128

The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.

Cognitive Behavioral Treatment Reduces Recidivism

Cognitive behavioral therapy has become the principal method of treating humans with behavioral issues.[i] Cognitive behavioral therapy is based on the premise that human thought processes affect behavior, that people can become more aware of their thought processes, that they can change their thought processes, and that these changes in thought processes result in changes in behavior. These programs include such programs as errors in criminal thinking. Therapy based on the cognitive-behavioral model has been shown to be effective in reducing recidivism.

MacKenzie (2006) and her colleagues conducted a literature review and a meta-analysis of the literature and concluded that “cognitive-behavioral programs appear to be effective in reducing future criminal activities of offenders.”[ii] Aos et al. (2006) and Drake et al (2009) completed a meta-analysis of 545 studies of correctional programs.[iii] They concluded that the following cognitive-behavior programs were effective in reducing recidivism (followed by the percentage reduction in the recidivism rate); Cognitive-behavior drug treatment in prison (-6.8%), general and specific cognitive-behavioral treatment programs for the general offender population (-8.2%), sex offender cognitive-behavioral treatment in prison (-14.9%), and cognitive-behavioral treatment for low risk sex offenders on probation (-31.2%). [iv] Drake et al (2009) found that cognitive-behavioral therapy in prison or the community had one of the highest cost-benefit ratios of the treatment regimes they evaluated.[v]

Andrews and Bonta (2010) argue that the majority of criminal offenders learn through doing rather than through didactic teaching, and therefore cognitive-behavioral therapies match the offenders’ learning style making it far more effective than other types of therapy.[vi]

Andrews and Bonta argue that the key to any successful treatment is to 1.) identify the risk level of offenders, and target the high and medium risk offenders for the more intensive treatment. (low risk offenders should not interact with high risk offenders), 2.) identify those criminological needs that have been associated with criminal offending, and 3.) develop a treatment program in a style and mode that reflects the individual ability and learning style of the offender.[vii] Again, Andrews and Bonta argue that programs based on the cognitive-behavioral method are the effective treatment programs to reduce recidivism.

Aos et al (2006) also found the following programs to be effective (program followed by percentage reduction in recidivism rate) : 1. drug treatment in the community (-12.6%) , drug treatment in jail (-6.0%), adult drug courts (-10.7), intensive probation supervision with treatment (-21.9%) (intensive probation supervision without treatment had no effect.); in-prison therapeutic communities with community aftercare (-6.9%), in-prison therapeutic communities without community aftercare (-5.3%).[viii]

Aos et al identified several programs that that require additional study, but may be effective as they show early promise. Those programs are therapeutic programs for mentally ill offenders, and a program called “Circles of Support and Accountability” where five volunteers visit or contact sex offenders each week.

These studies have identified many programs that don’t work. I will address those programs in another entry.

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[i] MacKenzie, Doris Layton (2006), What works in Corrections-Reducing the Criminal Activities of Offenders and Delinquents, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 112.

[ii] Ibid, p. 114.

[iii] Drake, Elizabeth K. Steve Aos and Marna G. Miller, 2009, “Evidence-Based Public Policy Options to Reduce Crime and Criminal Justice Costs: Implications in Washington State” Victims and Offenders, 4:170-196; Aos, Steve, Marna Miller, and Elizabeth Drake, (2006). “Evidence-Based Adult Corrections Programs: What Works and What Does Not.” Olympia:Washington State Institute for Public Policy.

[iv] Ibid Aos et al (2006), p. 3

[v] Ibid Drake et al (2009) p. 184.

[vi] Andrews, D.A. and James Bonta, 2010, The Psychology of Criminal Conduct 5^th Ed., New Jersey, Matthew Bender, p. 539.

[vii] Ibid, pp 44-52.

[viii] Ibid Aos et al (2006) p. 3.

The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.

"Nothing Works" in Reducing Recidivism is False

In the mid 1970’s, a summary of 231 studies of correctional programs were reviewed and evaluated based on their effectiveness in reducing criminal recidivism. The ultimate conclusion of the researchers was that “nothing works” in reducing recidivism of offenders.[i] Other researchers have criticized these reviews and conclusions. The conclusion that “nothing works” to reduce recidivism probably wasn’t true back in the 1975, and is certainly not true today.

One group of researchers argued that the Martinson review cited above, demonstrated knowledge destruction as the conclusions were simply not empirically based. However, at the time, the Martinson conclusions were politically acceptable from both ends of the political spectrum. Researchers now argue that the empirical research had identified programs that work to reduce recidivism then, and the research has identified programs that work now.[ii]

Recently, there have been several comprehensive meta-analyses and analytical reviews of the literature to attempt to identify correctional programs that are effective in reducing recidivism and those that are cost effective. Of course, the goal is to use the effective programs and eliminate the ineffective programs.[iii]

I will discuss some of the findings of what works in corrections to reduce recidivism. I will warn anyone that is looking for a silver bullet program that is going to reduce recidivism by close to 100%, that these programs don’t exist. Recidivism reduction in the 10% to 15% range compared to control groups is on the high end. The question is do the benefits of the programs outweigh the costs.

Throughout the treatment literature, one principal stands out. To increase the efficacy of any treatment modality, one first needs to identify the group of offenders at highest risk to re-offend, identify the criminologic factors of those high-risk offenders that contribute to their offending, and then design treatment to address those factors. Treatment resources should not be wasted on offenders with a low risk to re-offend or those lacking the problems that the treatment modality is designed to meet.[iv]

Vocational education of offenders with job placement was shown by all three groups of researchers to reduce recidivism. According to Drake et al (2009), recidivism is reduced about 10% with vocational education in prison, and it provides the greatest return on investment of any program. Job placement increases the effectiveness of vocational training by about three-fold.[v]

Adult basic education again has been shown to reduce recidivism. Andrews and Bonta (2010) and Drake et al (2009) both concluded that adult basic education reduced recidivism. MacKenzie (2006) found adult basic education to be promising. Drake (2009) estimated a reduction in recidivism by 8.6% from adult basic education.

Working in correctional industries in prison has also been shown to have a positive effect on reducing recidivism. Andrews and Bonta (2010) did not address correctional industries. The other two research groups found that work in correctional industries was effective in reducing recidivism. Drake (2009) estimated that correctional industries reduced recidivism by 6.4% over nonparticipants.

The above examples show that educational programs and work programs have been shown to be effective in reducing recidivism. I will discuss more structured correctional treatment in my next entry.

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[i] Martinson, R. (1974). “What Works—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform.” The Public Interest, 35, 22-54; Lipton, D., R. Martinson & J. Wilks (1975) The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment: A Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies.New York: Praeger.

[ii] Andrews, D.A. and James Bonta, 2010, The Psychology of Criminal Conduct 5^th Ed., New Jersey, Matthew Bender, p. 351-356.

[iii] Ibid; MacKenzie, Doris Layton (2006), What works in Corrections-Reducing the Criminal Activities of Offenders and Delinquents, New York, Cambridge University Press; Drake, Elizabeth K. Steve Aos and Marna G. Miller, 2009, “Evidence-Based Public Policy Options to Reduce Crime and Criminal Justice Costs: Implications in Washington State” Victims and Offenders, 4:170-196; Aos, Steve, Marna Miller, and Elizabeth Drake, (2006). “Evidence-Based Adult Corrections Programs: What Works and What Does Not.” Olympia:Washington State Institute for Public Policy.

[iv] Ibid ii above, p. 111 and chapter 12.

[v] Ibid, p. 265.

The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.

Prison and the Tragedy of the Commons

On Sunday, the New York Times reported that, in Missouri, judges are now given estimates of the cost of potential sentences before they make their sentencing decisions. Missouri Tells Judges Cost of Sentences . As someone who was indoctrinated with economics for six of my formative years, looking at the cost of a decision seems not merely reasonable, but the only responsible way to make a thoughtful decision.

As trial judges in Wisconsin have tremendous discretion in setting the length of a sentence, and that discretion has broadened over the last approximately 20 years, the consideration of the cost of a sentence is especially important. First, sentences are reviewed under the most deferential appellate standard—the erroneous exercise of discretion—resulting in little appellate oversight of sentences.

Secondly, over the last twenty years the legislature has increased the maximum penalties for most crimes giving judges a wide range of penalties for most crimes. For example, at the extreme, for a class B felony, a judge can sentence someone to a period of initial confinement, without the possibility of parole review, somewhere between zero days and forty years. Based on my experience, in the past, the legislative maximum had more often provided the cap on sentences. I can remember when prosecutors were always concerned about getting convictions for multiple crimes so that the maximum possible penalty could be increased with consecutive sentences.

Now, obtaining multiple convictions is rarely a concern as a conviction for one crime, with the higher penalties, is often sufficient to provide an appropriate sentence range for a defendant. Judges are rarely constrained by legislative maximums, as they are sufficiently high. The effect of legislatively increasing the maximum penalties has been shifting the responsibility of setting the effective (as opposed to the legal) maximum penalty from the legislature to the judiciary. On top of the longer sentence potential, we also have truth-in-sentencing, where, with some exceptions, judges decide when a defendant can be released from prison at the time of sentence. All of which makes the judge’s initial sentencing decision all that more important and which argues for the use of consideration of the cost of a sentence.

Incentive and cost mismatches occur with our sentencing. A prison sentence, for example, has the indirect cost to the defendant in loss of freedom, lost wages, and lost contribution to family and society, along with the direct cost of incarceration (the cost being considered by Missouri judges). Those costs are considered against the benefits of locking someone up. When a judge sentences someone to prison, he or she has decided to spend somewhere in the range of $25,000 per year of state taxpayer’s money for each year of incarceration. A problem arises from mismatched economic incentives.

In Wisconsin, judges are elected by citizens of each county; whereas the costs are born by citizens of the State of Wisconsin as a whole—most who will never be able to vote for or against the judge. Only a very small portion of the costs of incarceration will be paid by the taxpayers of the judge’s county whereas most of the benefits of incarceration, in terms of community safety and retribution, will accrue to the residents of the judge’s county as it is likely that the defendant and the victims of the crime came from the judge’s county. Judge Richard Posner has written that elected judges, because they will be subject to a performance review in the form of a re-election requirement, have to be somewhat sensitive to the electorate when making decisions.[i] (The elected judges may also more closely match the values of the electorate than appointed judges and make decisions that are more in line with this common value system.)

While judges are electorally held responsible for considering the benefits and the indirect costs to the defendant and his/her family, because most of the direct cost of incarceration is not born by citizens of the judge’s county, judges are not electorally held responsible for considering or not considering the direct cost of incarceration.

This mismatch of the signals of the benefits and cost of incarceration create a negative economic externality—a cost born by someone other than the decision maker. Prisons become the commons—the place in the village where everyone’s cows can graze without cost to the individual cow herder resulting in the pasture being overgrazed. Everyone’s cows starve. We have the tragedy of the commons.[ii] By not even considering costs of incarceration at sentencing, and not being held electorally accountable for these costs, the prison system becomes the commons. Are our overcrowded prisons, partially the result of the tragedy of the commons?

Like many people, I am concerned about our society being able to provide needed government services at a cost the citizenry are willing and able to pay. Would the system be better if criminal sentencing would be handled like juvenile delinquencies, or mental commitments, where the county receives a block of money to spend on corrections, and when people are sent to prison, that money comes from the county coffers? Would sentences be different if judges would have to justify spending county dollars for incarceration? I think an explicit consideration of the costs of a sentence is appropriate.

Although a fair and just sentence is much more than a straight economic decision, economics will always provide a tether as to what a society can or cannot do. That maxim has held for all societies in all ages. We in the criminal justice system ignore it at our peril.

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[i] Posner, Richard A., (2008) “How Judges Think”, Harvard University Press, p. 135.

[ii] See Hardin, Garrett (1968) "The Tragedy of the Commons", Science, Vol. 162, No. 3859 pp. 1243-1248

The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.

Hedonics and Punishment

Defendants are sentenced to prison for either incapacitation purposes or for punishment. Theoretically, punishment serves the joint goals of retribution (just deserts), general deterrence of other potential offenders, and specific deterrence of the sentenced offender. Longer prison sentences are assumed to equate with increased punishment of the offender. Psychological research suggests that this assumption may not be correct.

Robinson and Darley discuss research on different aspects of the “hedonic treadmill.”[i] The hedonic treadmill theory posits that while an individual’s level of happiness is initially affected by a positive or negative change in life circumstances, with time, the individual’s level of happiness returns to its original state. A defendant sentenced to prison will initially experience his change of circumstances as a negative event. However, as time passes, he adapts to his situation, prison becomes his life, and his level of happiness returns to the level it was before he went to prison. Because of the hedonic treadmill, the prison sentence has lost its bite as punishment and, hence, as a negative reinforcement. [ii]

Furthermore, humans also have the ability to become desensitized to changes within their environment. When conditions in prison change for the better or the worse from one day to the next, prisoners adapt to these changed conditions and experience them as minor changes in their levels of contentment. The prisoners become hardened to prison life. [iii]

Recent psychological research also undermines the assumption that longer sentences imply more punishment. Robinson and Darley discuss research that shows that duration of a punishment has little effect on the amount of remembered pain. Research showed that after individuals experienced a short period of intense pain and the same short period of the same intense pain followed by a longer period of less pain, they remember the short period of the intense pain followed by a longer period of less pain as less unpleasant than just the short period of intense pain. This researcher opined that individuals remember a negative experience as an average of the most extreme pain during the experience and the pain at the end of the experience.[iv]

Robinson and Darley point out that a shorter sentence has a greater likelihood of being felt as aversive at its end as a longer sentence. They conclude as follows: “The startling realization is that this short sentence will be experienced as more aversive than a much longer sentence that is equally aversive at the beginning but less so at the end! There are two reasons for this. The first is that, under the duration neglect account, the much longer duration of the long sentence contributes little or nothing to the reconstructed negativity of the remembered sentence. The second reason is that the ‘end-point intensity’ of the short sentence comes before it has had an opportunity to decay, while the end point intensity of the longer sentence is reduced at the end. The point here is that lengthening sentences may actually reduce their recalled negative character if the end experiences are relatively less aversive!”[v]

Robinson and Darley point out that society is getting a diminished “punishment” bang for their buck with longer sentences. (Of course, incapacitation is still effective.) The cost of incarceration remains constant as the value of the incarceration in the currency of punishment declines. [vi] The marginal punishment declines with sentence length.

This body of research implies that a shorter period of incarceration may be remembered as more unpleasant than a longer sentence. If a negative reinforcement for specific deterrence purposes is what was intended by the sentence of incarceration, then a shorter sentence may be more effective. Further research is required to outline the contours of the relationship between the lengths of incarceration and the levels of punishment. The study of hedonics has alerted us to other reasons why deterrence through longer sentences has not been shown to be a very robust factor in reducing recidivism.

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[i] Robinson, Paul H., and John H. Darley, 2004, “Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science Investigation”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 24, No 2, p.187.

[ii] Ibid. p. 188.

[iii] Ibid p. 188

[iv] Ibid p. 190; D. Redelmeier and Daniel Kahneman, 1996, “Patients Memories of Painful Medical Treatments: Real Time and Retrospective Evaluations of Two Minimally Invasive Procedures”, 116 Pain 3.

[v] Robinson and Darley, Ibid p. 190.

[vi] Ibid, p. 189

The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.

Why Deterrence Has Minimal Impact

In my last entry, I discussed the empirical research regarding the efficacy of deterring crime through increased sentences, as opposed to preventing crime through incapacitation from increased sentences. I want to discuss the psychological research as to why deterrence is not very effective.

Paul H. Robinson of the University of Pennsylvania Law School and John M Darley, a psychologist at Princeton, discuss what the research says about the ability to use increased punishment to deter crime.[i] First, to be clear, no one is arguing that eliminating punishment for crime would not result in all sorts of problems. These researchers, as well as myself, believe that a functioning criminal justice system that applies appropriate punishment for criminal acts is required for a functioning society. The only question that is being examined is the ability to deter crimes by increasing punishment for that crime, given the crime is already being punished.

Deterrence theory posits that individuals undertake a cost-benefit analysis before a crime is committed. If the perceived benefits exceed the costs, the crime is committed, if not, the crime is deterred and not committed.

Robinson and Darley discuss their research showing that while individuals have an intuitive feeling of what is wrong, they do not know the nuances of what is and is not legal within the individual’s jurisdictions.[ii] They also discuss another study of incarcerated felons. Twenty-two percent of these felons knew what the punishment would be for the crime, 18 percent either had no idea what the penalty was or thought they knew but were wrong, and 35 percent didn’t even think about the penalty.[iii]

Robinson and Darley also argue that the research shows that individuals that involve themselves with crime are less inclined to think about the consequences of their actions, be risk takers, and are more impulsive than the average person. Further, alcohol and drug use alter these individuals ability to make rational decisions. Superimposed on these qualities of an offender are often temporary states of mind such as the desire for revenge, rage, paranoia, and other mental illnesses or disorders that do not rise to the level of a legal defense. [iv]

The authors of this article also explain that crimes are often committed with other individuals creating an arousal effect, and that group decisions and actions increase the risk-taking of the individuals in the group over what they would do individually.[v]

Robinson and Darley further discuss the research on the perceived cost of crime by criminals. First, conditioning research would say that changing behavior through punishment is difficult if not impossible at low rates of punishment. For example, research shows that a ten percent punishment rate results in no reduction in the behavior. If crime is not being detected and punished at a high rate, the behavior will be difficult to deter.[vi] Further, research has shown that people regularly over-estimate their ability. Criminals will probably under-estimate the likelihood that they will be caught and punished.[vii]

These researchers also discuss that the amount of punishment is not likely to deter. They discuss a study in which graduated punishment results in the necessity to inflict large amounts of punishment to obtain deterrence. Robinson and Darley suggest that this research implies that by punishing first offenders lightly, we may be reducing our ability to ever deter these individuals, as they have learned to tolerate punishment. [viii]

Robinson and Darley also discuss research regarding the “hedonic-treadmill”. That discussion deserves a separate blog entry itself.

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[i] Robinson, Paul H., and John H. Darley, 2004, “Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science Investigation”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 24, No 2, pp. 173-205.

[ii] Ibid., p 175-76

[iii] Anderson, David (2002) “The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the Pickpocket’s Hanging”, 4 Amer. Law and Econ. Rev. 295

[iv] Ibid, p 179.

[v] Ibid. p. 180.

[vi] Ibid. pp 183-84.

[vii] Ibid p. 185.

[viii] Ibid. p. 186.

The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.

Deterrence Effect Weak

Deterrence is often used as a justification for increased punishment for criminal acts. From a law and economics perspective, the expected punishment for a criminal act is the product of the chance of being arrested and convicted and the punishment meted-out after a conviction. Increasing criminal penalties is one way the expected punishment for a crime can be increased. The other way is by increasing the chance of arrest and conviction.

However, increasing expected punishment can theoretically reduce crime in two ways. The first way that crime may decline with an increase in expected punishment is through deterrence. Individuals, who would otherwise commit a crime with a lower expected punishment, modify their behavior and not commit the crime due to the increase in expected punishment. They decide the cost of the crime is too high compared to its benefits.

The second way crime is reduced through an increase in expected punishment is through incapacitation. If individuals who would otherwise commit crimes are convicted and incarcerated, then the number of crimes committed should decline because the individual’s circumstances prevent them from committing the crime. Separating incapacitation effects from deterrence effects provides a methodological challenge to researchers.

A recent meta-analysis of the research on deterrence found that the deterrent effect is small, especially when one looks at the more rigorous studies. Specifically, the deterrence effect from greater punishment is small to non-existent and deterrence from the certainty of punishment slightly larger. [i]

One researcher of criminal deterrence is Steven D. Levitt of the University of Chicago and Freakonomics fame. In two research papers, Levitt provides support for deterrence under certain circumstances. Levitt, in a procedurally innovative study, concluded that increasing arrest rates lead to a reduction in crime and the reduction from deterrence was greater than that from incapacitation, especially for property crimes.[ii] By increasing the chances of arrest, one may increase deterrence. The findings in this study do not address increased penalties on changes in crime due to deterrence.

In a second research paper, Levitt examined the differential of punishment between juvenile and adult criminal justice systems in various states. Levitt concluded that the increased penalties in the adult criminal justice system reduced crime. The deterrence effect was almost twice as great for violent crimes compared to property crimes. In situations where defendants have reason to know and understand the differential of criminal penalties, deterrence is present. (Incidentally, he further concluded that there was not a strong relationship between the punitiveness of the juvenile justice system and a juvenile defendant’s involvement in crime as an adult.) [iii]

If deterrence is not effective, then prison sentences that exceed those required to address incapacitation needs and just deserts for the crime, may be a waste of societal resources. If deterrence is effective, then such sentences may reduce overall societal crime. However, it appears that deterrence effect is small, if it exists at all, and depends on the individual case.

The reason deterrence may not be as effective under many circumstances involves some basic psychological principles of human behavior and behavior modification. I will discuss that research in my next entry.

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[i] Pratt, Travis C., Francis T. Cullen, Kristie R. Blevins, Leah E. Daigle, and Tamara D. Madsen, 2006, “The Empirical Status of Deterrence Theory: A Meta-Analysis” pp 3670370 in: Taking Stock: The Status of Criminological Theory, Francis Cullen et al, editors, Transaction Publishers.

[ii] Levitt, Steven D, 1998, “Why do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce Crime: Deterrence, Incapacitation, or Measurement Error”, Economic Inquiry, Jul 1998, pp. 353-372.

[iii] Levitt, Steve D., 1998, “Juvenile Crime and Punishment,”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 106 No. 6 pp 1156-1185.

The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.