tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-73146536219702213132024-03-14T02:10:12.954-05:00To Speak the TruthResearch-based law--the use of science to inform the practice of Wisconsin law.Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.comBlogger79125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-16986641994819425842017-11-16T09:20:00.000-06:002017-11-16T09:22:56.654-06:00A Criticism of the Cicchini and White Studies on the Criminal Burden of Proof InstructionThe Cicchini and White (CW) studies on Wisconsin's pattern criminal burden of proof jury instruction raise concerns that Wisconsin's citizens may not have the protection against wrongful convictions required by the United States Constitution. While I agree with the authors that the studies provide strong empirical evidence that the instruction is flawed, I disagree (with moderate doubt) about what language compromises the instruction.<br />
<br />
CW primarily focuses on "the truth-related language" i.e "You are to search for the truth". They recognize that the part of the instruction that states "you are not to search for doubt" is particularly troubling. I believe the part of the instruction that contradicts the jurors duty to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt by ordering them not to search for doubt is most likely the offending phrase.<br />
<br />
The CW studies test both phrases used together. They tested Wisconsin's instruction that states: "While you are to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt. You are not to search for doubt. You are to search for the truth." We cannot tease-out from the CW studies whether the offending language is the order not to search for doubt or the order to search for the truth, or both combined. All one can say from the studies, is that the two phrases used together appear to undermine the criminal burden of proof.<br />
<br />
As I discussed in previous posts, I believe that the jurors have the duty to search both for truth and the doubt surrounding that truth. Reasonable arguments against retaining the language regarding truth have been made. Reasonable arguments against the language have also been made. Most jurisdictions do not use language regarding truth. Such language is not mandatory. I am somewhat neutral on the issue.<br />
<br />
My concern is the admonition to not search for doubt. As stated above, that statement linguistically and logically contradicts the jurors' duty to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt. It is the statement used by prosecutors at closing to vitiate the reasonable doubt burden of proof. I do not believe that any state that at one time countenanced the phrase "you are not to search for doubt" (Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Minnesota) has retained the phrase in their pattern jury instruction.<br />
<br />
<br />
The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-11944336607951881212017-11-05T07:48:00.000-06:002017-11-06T07:24:11.265-06:00 Epistemological Traditionalism, Rationalism, and Paradigm Shifts<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
</div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
</div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
As discussed in
detail in my last couple of posts, I believe controlled experiments
have cast doubt on Wisconsin's pattern jury instruction on reasonable
doubt, specifically that the instruction does not afford those
charged with a crime the protection against wrongful convictions
required by the United States Constitution. The results of those
experiments are corroborated by observations that the admonition “not
to search for doubt” has been used by prosecutors at trial to
undermine the beyond the reasonable doubt burden of proof.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=7314653621970221313#sdendnote1sym" name="sdendnote1anc">i</a></sup></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
<br /></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
The question now
is how the legal system will respond. So far the only authority
addressing the two Cicchini and White studies has been the Wisconsin
Criminal Jury Instruction Committee, which has (apparently not
unanimously) rejected the science and maintained the status quo. My
musings on the topic have also been summarily rejected by some (but
not all) on that committee. I have had my doubts that many of those
trained in the law, especially many judges, would be able to
transition between an authority based system of knowledge and a
science based system. <span style="color: #333333;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif;"><span style="font-size: small;">(See
</span></span></span><a href="https://bauersteven.blogspot.com/2010/07/clash-of-knowledge-culture.html"><span style="color: #cc6600;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><u>https://bauersteven.blogspot.com/2010/07/clash-of-knowledge-culture.html</u></span></span></span></a><span style="color: #333333;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif;"><span style="font-size: small;">) </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif;"><span style="font-size: small;">
</span></span>
</div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
<span style="color: #333333;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></span></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
One of the
eminent thinkers on the philosophy of science, Karl Popper, discussed
the epistemic differences between authority and science. He called
them epistemological traditionalism and rationalism respectively.<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=7314653621970221313#sdendnote2sym" name="sdendnote2anc">ii</a></sup>
</div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
<br /></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
Popper wrote:
“For we can interpret traditionalism as the belief that, in the
absence of an objective and discernible truth, we are faced with the
choice between accepting the authority of tradition, and chaos; while
rationalism has, of course, always claimed the right of reason and of
empirical science to criticize, and to reject, any tradition, and any
authority, as being based on sheer unreason or prejudice or
accident.” <a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=7314653621970221313#sdendnote3sym" name="sdendnote3anc"><sup>iii</sup></a>(Popper
was also the person who originated the idea, familiar to most
scientists, of “falsifiability” being the principal demarcating
science from other endeavors. The Cicchini and White study was an
example of research that meets this criterion.)</div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
<br /></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
To maybe better
understand the initial response to the empirical research and my
article regarding the criminal burden of proof, I believe the
insights of another preeminent philosopher of science may be helpful.
Thomas S. Kuhn discussed how science changes through revolutionary
changes in paradigms. He argues that the competing paradigms are
“incommensurable” in that “the proponents of competing
paradigms practice their trades in different worlds....Practicing in
different worlds, the two groups of scientists see different things
when they look from the same point in the same direction. Again, that
is not to say that they can see anything they please. Both are
looking at the world, and what they look at has not changed. But in
some areas they see different things, and they see them in different
relations to one another. That is why a law that cannot even be
demonstrated to one group of scientists may occasionally seem
intuitively obvious to another.”<sup><a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=7314653621970221313#sdendnote4sym" name="sdendnote4anc">iv</a></sup></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
<br /></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
A different
scientific paradigm influences one's understanding of what one
perceives. <i>A fortiori</i>, a different epistemic paradigm, such as
between authority and science, will shape one's response to
evidence.
</div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
<br /></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
Under a science
paradigm, potential evidence should be examined and explicitly
critiqued. Challenges to the evidence is part of the scientific
process and is encouraged. Scientific conclusions are always only
tentative, and valid only until further studies undermine them.</div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
<br /></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
Under an
authority paradigm, the defining feature is obedience to the
authority. An authoritative pronouncement is considered correct and
final. Evidence to the contrary is irrelevant and not of interest.
Questioning an authoritarian decision is considered defiance.
</div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
<br /></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
Back in 1897,
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. wrote: “For the rational study of law the
blackletter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the
future is the man of statistics and the master of economics." <a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=7314653621970221313#sdendnote5sym" name="sdendnote5anc"><sup>v</sup></a>
I believe Justice Holmes overstated the case for statistics and
economics in the law. Regardless, the future is not yet here,
although some in the legal profession are allowing decisions to be
informed by statistical evidence in what is now called
“evidence-based” practices.</div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
<br /></div>
<div style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: 0.04in;">
As a judge, I
fully understand that legal decisions are, and must be, mostly about knowledge from authority to differentiate them from <i>ad hoc</i> decision making. I must obey
binding authority: the statutes and constitutions, and the rulings
from the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and
the United States Supreme Court. None of these authorities mandate the use of
the objected to language in the jury instruction. Ultimately, the decision to modify the pattern jury instruction involves a choice between two authorities--the United States Constitution and its interpretation by the United States Supreme Court, and the Wisconsin pattern jury instruction. In the end, I follow authority.<br />
<br />
I also believe
that science can inform some legal decisions, and whether or not the
current Wisconsin criminal burden of proof jury instruction clearly conveys to jurors their duties related to reasonable doubt is one of
them.<br />
<br />
<br /></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div id="sdendnote1">
<div class="sdendnote">
<a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=7314653621970221313#sdendnote1anc" name="sdendnote1sym">i</a>One
of the tenets of the field of linguistics called Pragmatics is one
can devine the meaning of a phrase from the context in which it is
used.</div>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote2">
<div class="sdendnote">
<a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=7314653621970221313#sdendnote2anc" name="sdendnote2sym">ii</a>Popper,
Karl R., <i>On the Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance</i>,
Encounter, September 1962, pp. 42-57</div>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote3">
<div class="sdendnote">
<a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=7314653621970221313#sdendnote3anc" name="sdendnote3sym">iii</a>Ibid.
p.44.</div>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote4">
<div class="sdendnote">
<a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=7314653621970221313#sdendnote4anc" name="sdendnote4sym">iv</a>Kuhn,
Thomas S., <i>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 4</i><sup><i>th</i></sup><i>
Ed</i>., University of Chicago Press 1962, 2012., p. 149.</div>
</div>
<a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=7314653621970221313#sdendnote5anc" name="sdendnote5sym" style="font-size: small;">v</a><span style="font-size: x-small;">
</span>Holmes, Oliver Wendell. "<i>The Path of Law</i>", 10
Harvard Law Review 457 (1897).The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-90893704028752987972017-10-30T12:41:00.001-05:002017-10-30T12:41:50.497-05:00Second Study Casts Reasonable Doubt on Wisconsin’s Criminal Burden of Proof Instruction<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
The results of a second study has provided further empirical
proof that Wisconsin’s pattern criminal burden of proof jury instruction may
not afford those accused of a crime the protection against wrongful convictions
required by the United States Constitution.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=7314653621970221313#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
This study, also done by Cicchini and
White, replicates the first study. This study was published in a peer reviewed
rather than a refereed journal. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In this study, the pattern jury instruction on the criminal
burden of proof for the Seventh Circuit was compared with the same instruction but
with the last lines of Wisconsin’s pattern instruction added--<i>“While it is your duty to give the defendant
the benefit of every reasonable doubt, you are not to search for doubt. You are
to search for the truth.”<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<i><br /></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The jurors who received the instruction without the last two
lines of Wisconsin’s pattern instruction had a group conviction rate of 22.6%
while those receiving the same instruction with the last two lines included
convicted at a rate of 33.1%. This difference was statistically significant.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
After returning the verdict, study participants were asked
to choose only one answer regarding the burden of proof:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
<span style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;"> A. </span>If I have a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s
guilt, I must not convict the defendant.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
B. Even if I have a reasonable doubt about the
defendant’s guilt, I may still convict the defendant, if, in my search for the
truth, the evidence shows the defendant is guilty.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Fifteen percent of those jurors who received the 7<sup>th</sup>
Circuit pattern jury instruction believed the incorrect answer, B, to be
correct. Twenty-eight percent of those who received the same instruction but
with Wisconsin’s last two lines believed incorrect answer “B” was the correct
response. The difference between these percentages was statistically
significant.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.5pt; border: none; mso-element: para-border-div; padding: 0in 0in 1.0pt 0in;">
<div class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; mso-border-bottom-alt: solid windowtext 1.5pt; mso-padding-alt: 0in 0in 1.0pt 0in; padding: 0in;">
Further, 21% of those who correctly
understood the burden of proof found the defendant guilty. Fifty-four percent
of those that incorrectly understood the burden of proof found the defendant
guilty. The difference was statistically significant. It would appear that a
correct understanding of the burden of proof is consequential, and refutes
those who say that jury instructions are meaningless to jurors.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; mso-border-bottom-alt: solid windowtext 1.5pt; mso-padding-alt: 0in 0in 1.0pt 0in; padding: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; mso-border-bottom-alt: solid windowtext 1.5pt; mso-padding-alt: 0in 0in 1.0pt 0in; padding: 0in;">
I believe how the court system
handles this burden of proof issue in light of this research will provide great
insight on a concern that I had voiced earlier (See <a href="https://bauersteven.blogspot.com/2010/07/clash-of-knowledge-culture.html">https://bauersteven.blogspot.com/2010/07/clash-of-knowledge-culture.html</a>)
regarding the differences between the
functional theory of knowledge of the legal profession and of those trained in
scientific methods. I plan on writing more on this important topic of the burden of proof shortly. <o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div style="border-bottom: solid windowtext 1.5pt; border: none; mso-element: para-border-div; padding: 0in 0in 16.0pt 0in;">
<div class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; mso-border-bottom-alt: solid windowtext 1.5pt; mso-padding-alt: 0in 0in 16.0pt 0in; padding: 0in;">
On a related issue, Mr. Cicchini wrote a paper, that
appears to be quite cogent to me, that discusses and defends attacks on his and
Dr. White’s previous study.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=7314653621970221313#_edn2" name="_ednref2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div>
<!--[if !supportEndnotes]--><br clear="all" />
<hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<!--[endif]-->
<div id="edn1">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=7314653621970221313#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Cicchini, Michael D, and
White, Lawrence T., <i>Testing the Impact of
Criminal Jury Instructions on Verdicts: A conceptual Replication, 117 </i>Columbia
Law Review Online 22 (2017).<i> <o:p></o:p></i></div>
</div>
<div id="edn2">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
</div>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=7314653621970221313#_ednref2" name="_edn2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[ii]</span></span></span></a> <span style="background: white; color: #333333;"> https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3043907</span><br />
<br />
The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-1551720666884693802017-10-24T08:17:00.000-05:002017-10-24T08:17:22.720-05:00Why Wisconsin's Criminal Burden of Proof Instruction Had to Be Changed<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
People with even a glancing understanding of our
criminal justice system are familiar with the quote of the English jurist
William Blackstone: “For the law holds
it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer".<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="T2"></a><a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
American jurists have also voiced a similar view as
Blackstone. Justice John Marshall Harlan saw the criminal burden of proof of
beyond a reasonable doubt as a primary bulwark against wrongful convictions.
Justice Harlan wrote: “I view the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed
on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn2" name="_ednref2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
<span style="color: #212121; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Justice William Brennan, with a statistically slant, understood
the protections of the criminal burden of proof in the same way: “There is
always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in fact finding,
which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an
interest of transcending value—as a criminal defendant his liberty—this margin
of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the
burden of producing a sufficiency of proof in the first instance, and of
persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.”<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn3" name="_ednref3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="color: #212121; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[iii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
We sing that the United States of America is “the land
of the free”. Locking up an innocent person is certainly antithetical to the
value of liberty. However, people with a working knowledge of the criminal law know
that on occasion, a jury gets it wrong and convicts an innocent person. Few
would argue that convicting an innocent person isn’t a tragedy for that person
and his or her family.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
The National Registry of Exonerations has documented
that since 1989 over fifty people who had been convicted of a crime in
Wisconsin courts, have been exonerated based on new evidence of innocence.<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn4" name="_ednref4" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[iv]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
The Wisconsin Innocence Project has also documented wrongful convictions.<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn5" name="_ednref5" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[v]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
Many of the cases the Wisconsin Court of Appeals and Wisconsin Supreme Court
have reversed on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence raise the issue
of a wrongful conviction. The question arises as to how many innocent people
are now staring at a prison wall grasping at imaginary threads of hope that new
evidence may turn up in their case to exonerate them too. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
A recent research article provides empirical evidence
that Wisconsin’s pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn6" name="_ednref6" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[vi]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
may contribute to wrongful convictions by reducing the beyond a reasonable
doubt burden of proof that was formulated to protect against convicting the
innocent. In <i>Truth or Doubt? An Empirical
Test of Criminal Jury Instructions,<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn7" name="_ednref7" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[vii]</span></b></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
</i>Cicchini and White tested three jury instructions. Three randomly selected
groups of approximately 100 individuals were assigned to read the same fact
pattern of a criminal case along with the prosecutor’s and defense counsel’s
closing arguments. The three groups of mock jurors were then given three
different jury instructions.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
The mock jurors in the first group were instructed that
the State had the burden of proving every fact necessary to constitute guilt,
but were not given an instruction regarding the beyond a reasonable doubt
burden of proof. Instead they were instructed, <i>“In reaching your verdict, you are not to search for doubt. You are to
search for the truth.”</i> With this instruction, 29.6% of the mock jurors
voted to convict.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
The mock jurors in the second group were given the
Wisconsin pattern jury instruction on the burden of proof but with the last
paragraph that states: <i>“While it is your
duty to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt, you are not
to search for doubt. You are to search
for the truth”</i> replaced with: <i>“It is
your duty to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt”</i>. With
this instruction, 16% of the mock jurors voted to convict.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
The third group of individuals were given the Wisconsin
pattern jury instruction with the pattern final paragraph which read: <i>“While it is your duty to give the defendant
the benefit of every reasonable doubt, you are not to search for doubt. You are to search for the truth.”</i> With
this instruction, 29% of the mock jurors voted to convict.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
The percentage of mock jurors who voted to convict was
almost twice as high (29% compared to 16%)
for those jurors who received Wisconsin’s pattern jury instruction
compared to those jurors who received the same instruction but <i>without</i> the last phrases, “<i>you are not to search for doubt. You are to
search for the truth.</i>” The difference between the 16% conviction rate and
the 29% conviction rate was statistically significant. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
In the Cicchini and White study, the group of jurors
given Wisconsin’s pattern jury instruction for the criminal burden of proof
convicted at about the same rate (29% compared to 29.6%) as those that didn’t
receive any instruction at all on reasonable doubt, but only the charge to not
search for doubt but to search for the truth, essentially the same instruction
given a jury in a civil case. The United
States Supreme Court warned against such a result when it held that the State
must prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. “[A] person accused of a crime would be at a
severe disadvantage, a disadvantage amounting to a lack of fundamental
fairness, if he could be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the
strength of the same evidence as would suffice in a civil case.”<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn8" name="_ednref8" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[viii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
The results of the Cicchini and White study alarmed me,
and should alarm all in the criminal justice system. As discussed above, the
beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof is designed to minimize the risk of a wrongful
conviction with the acceptance of a concomitant increase in risk that a guilty
person will be found not guilty. It is designed with the implicit assumption
that it is better that a guilty person go free than an innocent person be
convicted. The results of the Cicchini
and White study provides empirical evidence that the protection of the beyond a
reasonable doubt burden of proof has been degraded in the pattern instruction.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
Cicchini and White argue that the problem with the
instruction is “that the truth-related language at the end of an otherwise
proper reasonable doubt instruction actually diminishes the burden of proof.”<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn9" name="_ednref9" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[ix]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
They argue that trials are not a search for the truth, and are only about
whether the government has met its burden of proof.<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn10" name="_ednref10" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[x]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
Although I believe
Cicchini and White have identified something important regarding the Wisconsin
pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt, I think they misidentify the
problem. The instruction that the jury should search for the truth is not what
diminishes the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof. What diminishes the burden of proof is the
part of the instruction that says: “… you are not to search for doubt.” Any
critical analysis of evidence requires a search for both truth and doubt. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
In a criminal trial, the jurors are first instructed: “It is your duty to follow all of these
instructions.”<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn11" name="_ednref11" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xi]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
They are instructed that they are to give the defendant the benefit of every
reasonable doubt, but then at the end, the jurors are ordered that they are not
to search for doubt. The instruction is a court order to jurors to not identify
and critically evaluate the doubt around the evidence presented at trial. Without
this thought process, jurors cannot determine if a crime was proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jurors must search for the truth and must search for the
doubt surrounding any possible truth.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
Further proof that the
prohibition on searching for doubt vitiates the criminal burden of proof is
provided by experience in the courtroom. Anyone who has had any experience with
criminal trials knows the importance of these last two sentences. The meaning
of this phrase is made clear by its use. <a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn12" name="_ednref12" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
During closing arguments, the defense attorney often argues the burden of proof
instruction, many times not mentioning the last phrases, and then the prosecutor,
on rebuttal, says “Defense counsel read you only part of the jury instruction
on reasonable doubt. What counsel left out were these two lines: ‘you are not
to search for doubt. You are to search for the truth.’” <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
Prosecutors make this
argument because they know that the order prohibiting the search for doubt
diminishes the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof and makes it easier
for the State to obtain a conviction.<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn13" name="_ednref13" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xiii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
I have had these lines used against me as a defense attorney, and <i>mea culpa, mea culpa</i>, I have used them against defense counsel as
district attorney. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
Truth and doubt are
separate concepts in a criminal trial. The search for truth has been part of
the jury system since its inception. “Verdict” is derived from the latin words
“<i>verus</i>”, which means “truth”, and “<i>dictum</i>” which means “saying”. The “truth” in a jury trial is a social
construct of a social institution—the jury. The jury says the truth when it
delivers a verdict.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
Jurors “search for the truth” when they inductively
formulate coherent, probabilistic explanations about a historical event (reasonable
hypotheses) from the evidence presented to them at trial, explanations that are
based on reasonable inferences from the evidence. Ultimately, the search for
the truth involves a judgment as to whether any of the reasonable hypotheses
about what happened encompasses a secondary hypothesis that all elements of the
crime have been proven and that the defendant may be guilty.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
Doubt is the amount of confidence one has about the
probabilistic hypothesis that all elements of the crime were proven. If the jurors
unanimously find that the probabilistic hypothesis that all elements of the
crime were proven, then for the jurors to complete their jobs, they must still
grapple with the doubt around that hypothesis. They must determine what doubts
they have, and if any of the doubts are reasonable doubts as compared to
unreasonable doubts. If they unanimously believe the hypothesis that all the
elements of the crime have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt then they have
found the “truth” in a criminal trial. If they don’t unanimously find such a
hypothesis beyond a reasonable doubt, then they have found another “truth”—that
the elements of the crime have not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The
jury speaks the truth through its verdict.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
That truth and doubt are two separate concepts is made
clear when considering the various burdens of proof. The law has three burdens of proof for a jury
trial. The elements that the jury is
tasked to find, in other words the jury’s
search for the truth, may be the same in
each case. For example, the jury may be asked whether or not a battery had
occurred. The question asked is the same , however the acceptable level of
doubt is different with each different burden of proof, and the acceptable
level of doubt determines if “the truth” is found to support a verdict.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
In a civil case,
the burden of proof is to the greater weight of the credible evidence. The jurors
are instructed that if they are convinced that one side had more convincing
proof of what historically happened, then that side should win. If the
plaintiff’s version of events was more convincing than the defendant’s version,
then the jury has found “the truth” and the verdict should be for the
plaintiff. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
In other civil cases, such as civil forfeiture cases,
the burden of proof is clear satisfactory and convincing evidence. If the
evidence supporting the plaintiff’s version of events is not clear,
satisfactory, and convincing then the defendant should prevail, even if the
jury thought that the plaintiff’s version of what happened was more convincing
than the defendant’s version.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
In criminal cases
the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. If the evidence supporting the State’s
version of events is not beyond a reasonable doubt, then the defendant should
prevail, even if the jury believed that the State’s version of what happened
was more probable. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
In classical statistics terms, convicting an innocent
person is a “false positive” and called a type I error. Not convicting a guilty
person is a “false negative” and called a type II error.<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn14" name="_ednref14" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xiv]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
All burden of proof instructions apportion the risks between these two types of
error.<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn15" name="_ednref15" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xv]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
The beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof accepts less type I error but
with the cost of an increase in type II error. This apportionment of risk has
been set by the United States Supreme Court and has been part of our
jurisprudence from the beginning of our nation.<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn16" name="_ednref16" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xvi]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
Using the classical statistics paradigm, “what happened”
is akin to the expected value or mean. The burden of proof is akin to the
confidence interval around the mean. For
example, if the question is whether or not a large, opaque jar of marbles
contains more black marbles than red marbles (greater than 50%) and I blindly
reached into it and randomly make four selections, and three of the marbles are
black and one red, I could say: “Based
on a rational consideration of the evidence my best estimate is that this jar
contains 75% black marbles which means it contains more black marbles than red
marbles.” But I would also say: “I am not certain of that. I have my doubts. It
may have just been chance that I selected three black marbles. I may be way
off.” <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
But, if I blindly reached into a large opaque jar of
marbles and randomly made four hundred selections, and three hundred of the
marbles were black and one hundred of them were red, I could say: “Based on a rational
consideration of the evidence, my best estimate is that this jar contains 75%
black marbles which means it contains more black marbles than red marbles.” But now I would also say: “I am quite certain that
it contains more than 50% black marbles.” <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
The best estimate of the contents of the jar in both
cases is the simple mean. In both scenarios the simple mean was 75% black
marbles and 25% red marbles. The calculation of the mean is the search for the truth
of what actually is in the jar. The certainty of that estimate of the mean is
calculated using a different statistic called the standard error. The larger
the sample size, the smaller the standard error all other things remaining
equal. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
The standard of error is used to calculate a confidence interval.
For example, one could say in the scenario with four observations, “I am 95%
sure that the jar holds between 12% and 99%
black marbles.” The difference between the two numbers is the confidence
interval. The 95% confidence interval is wide in this scenario, 87 percentage
points, and the lower number (12%) is well below the 50% threshold. I would not
feel very certain that the jar contains more black marbles than red marbles.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
In the second scenario with 400 observations, one could
say: “I am 95% sure that the jar holds between 70% and 79% black marbles.” In
this scenario, the 95% confidence interval is only 9 percentage points and the
lower number (70%) is well above the 50% threshold. I would feel quite certain
that the jar contains more black marbles than red marbles.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
As you can see, the possible “truth” is the same under
both scenarios, the jar holds 75% black marbles. However, the certainty (and
its opposite, doubt) of the possible “truth” of the situation is very
different. Not searching for doubt is the same as saying don’t consider that a
difference exists between the 75% black marble estimate with a sample size of
four marbles and the 75% black marble estimate with a sample size of four
hundred marbles. One must search for the truth and one must search for doubt. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
For a rational and critical analysis of the evidence, a
juror must evaluate the evidence for the possible “truth” and for the doubt
surrounding this possible truth in light of the burden of proof for the type of
trial. If the possible truth is proven to the requisite burden of proof, then
“the truth” has been found, and a verdict for the plaintiff rendered. In a
criminal trial, for jurors to completely fulfill their responsibilities, they
need to identify and evaluate the doubts surrounding the possible truth. They
must determine if any of these doubts are “reasonable”. The jury instruction for the criminal burden
of proof that orders the jurors that they “…are not to search for doubt” is
clearly incorrect as it orders the jury not to critically examine doubt. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">
The lines that
instruct the jurors not to search for doubt but to search for the truth was
included in 1962 in the first pattern jury instruction on the criminal burden
of proof. Apparently the questionable
phrase in the pattern instruction was picked-up from a 1923 case in which the
judge instructed the jury “You are not to search for doubt, but you are to
search for the truth.” The Wisconsin
Supreme Court found no error with the instruction because the jury was
repeatedly warned that they should not find the defendant guilty unless they
were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court also stated: “It is
undoubtedly true that the aim of the jury should be to ascertain the truth…that
the purpose of a trial is to ascertain facts, and not the ascertainment of
doubt, which is the negation of a fact.”<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn17" name="_ednref17" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xvii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a><a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn18" name="_ednref18" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xviii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
Doubt is a not a
negation of a fact or the truth. A mistake
of fact, a falsehood, an untruth, or a lie is a negation of the truth. A fact
is not a negation of a doubt. Confidence, or certainty is the negation of
doubt. Doubt is a measurement of one’s lack of confidence that something is or
is not the truth. Doubt is a separate concept from truth. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
The Wisconsin Supreme
Court again addressed a claim of error regarding the two sentences in 1995. The
Court stated when the burden of proof instruction is challenged, the Court’s
duty is to examine the objected to language within the context of the entire
jury instruction to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the
jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based below that of beyond
a reasonable doubt. And then after
analyzing the entire burden of proof instruction held: “In the context of the
entire instruction, we conclude that Wis. J.I.—Criminal 140 (1991), which was
read to the jury, did not dilute the State's burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” <a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_edn19" name="_ednref19" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xix]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
The Supreme Court had to
cloak the objected to language in the entire reasonable doubt jury instruction
to not find that there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the
instructions to allow a conviction on proof less than beyond a reasonable
doubt. No argument was made that the objectionable language was somehow
supported by the law. The reasonable doubt jury instruction was found to pass
constitutional muster despite the offending language. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .3in;">
If one desires to maintain fidelity to the
constitutional apportionment of type 1 and type 2 error embodied in requirement
that the State must prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, there is no benefit in using the offending language. Retaining
this language adds nothing to the juror’s understanding of their duties. The
offending language only has the cost of vitiating the beyond a reasonable doubt
burden of proof.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .3in;">
Instructing the jury to not search for doubt, after
spending the entire first part of the jury instruction on giving the defendant
the benefit of every reasonable doubt, is like giving a traveler instructions
on how to get from Juneau to Beaver Dam and providing multiple warnings to be
careful of farm equipment pulling out of fields on blind curves and on blind
hills on the road between Juneau and Beaver Dam, only to then order the
traveler that they are not to not look for farm equipment but only look for the
road between Juneau and Beaver Dam. Such an instruction would be nonsense and
everyone would immediately recognize it as nonsense. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; tab-stops: 0in .3in .6in .9in 1.2in 1.5in 1.8in 2.1in 2.4in 2.7in 3.0in 3.3in 3.6in 3.9in 4.2in 4.5in 4.8in 5.1in 5.4in 5.7in 6.0in 6.3in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .3in;">
I
changed the last two lines of the criminal burden of proof instruction. I believe
the following change enhances the criminal justice system by more clearly
instructing jurors to adhere to our Constitution’s requirement that the State be
required to prove a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt. I believe this change
will decrease the chance that an innocent person will be convicted. The last
two lines of this instruction should be changed to: “<i>It is your duty to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable
doubt while you search for the truth.</i>”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .3in;">
As judges sworn to uphold the Constitution of the United
States to the best of our ability, we are not fulfilling our duty by retaining extraneous
language in a jury instruction that has a non-zero probability of violating the
Constitution. I believe the results of
the Cicchini and White study coupled with the way the offending clause has been
and is used by prosecutors at trial, should make one doubt whether the current
pattern jury instruction on the criminal burden of proof affords the citizens
of the State of Wisconsin with the protection against wrongful convictions that
the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof is designed to give. The pattern
jury instruction must be corrected.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; tab-stops: 0in .3in .6in .9in 1.2in 1.5in 1.8in 2.1in 2.4in 2.7in 3.0in 3.3in 3.6in 3.9in 4.2in 4.5in 4.8in 5.1in 5.4in 5.7in 6.0in 6.3in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .3in;">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div>
<!--[if !supportEndnotes]--><br clear="all" />
<hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<!--[endif]-->
<div id="edn1">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries;
Chapter 27, Of Trial, and Conviction<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn2">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref2" name="_edn2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> <u>In re Winship</u>, 397
U.S. 358, 372, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1077, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970), Justice Harlan
concurring.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn3">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref3" name="_edn3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[iii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> <u>Speiser v. Randall</u>,
357 U.S. 513, 525–26, 78 S. Ct. 1332, 1342, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1460 (1958).<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn4">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref4" name="_edn4" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[iv]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> National Registry of
Exonerations, A Project of the University of California Irvine Newkirk Center
for Science & Society, University of Michigan Law School, and Michigan
State University College of Law; <a href="http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx">www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx</a>;
<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn5">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref5" name="_edn5" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[v]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>Wisconsin Innocence
Project, <a href="http://law.wisc.edu/fjr/clinicals/ip/client_profiles.html">http://law.wisc.edu/fjr/clinicals/ip/client_profiles.html</a><o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn6">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref6" name="_edn6" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[vi]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Wis. J.I. – Criminal 140
(2000).<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn7">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref7" name="_edn7" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[vii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Michael D. Cicchini
& Lawrence T. White, <i>Truth or Doubt?
An Empirical Test of Criminal Jury Instructions</i>, Univ. 50Rich. L. Rev.1139
(May 2016)<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn8">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref8" name="_edn8" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[viii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> <u>In re Winship</u>,
397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970)<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn9">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref9" name="_edn9" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[ix]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Cicchini and White, p.
1155<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn10">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref10" name="_edn10" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[x]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Cicchini and White p 1139.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn11">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref11" name="_edn11" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xi]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Wis. J.I. – Criminal 100
(2000)<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn12">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref12" name="_edn12" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Pragmatics instructs that the contextual use
of a statement in a culture reveals the statement’s meaning. See for
example,
https://www.linguisticsociety.org/resource/meaning-semantics-and-pragmatics.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn13">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref13" name="_edn13" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xiii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Is it ethical for a
prosecutor to make such an argument?<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn14">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref14" name="_edn14" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xiv]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Snedecor and Cochran, <i>Statistical Methods</i>, 7<sup>th</sup>
Edition, 1980, p. 66.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn15">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref15" name="_edn15" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xv]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> <u>United States v.
Harper</u>, 662 F.3d 958, 961 (7<sup>th</sup>
Cir. 2011).<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn16">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref16" name="_edn16" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xvi]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> “The requirement that
guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt
dates at least from our early years as a Nation. The ‘demand for a higher
degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient
times, (though) its crystallization into the formula ‘beyond a reasonable
doubt’ seems to have occurred as late as 1798. “ In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
361, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1071, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970)<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn17">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref17" name="_edn17" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xvii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> <u>Manna v. State</u>,
179 Wis. 384 (1923).<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn18">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref18" name="_edn18" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xviii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> The phrase was probably originated from a case from another
state as it appears both Massachusetts and New Jersey at one time or another
also used this phrase.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="edn19">
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<a href="file://wicourts.gov/dodge/USER/Staff/SBAUER/burden%20of%20proof%20instruction%20article.docx#_ednref19" name="_edn19" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[xix]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> <u>State v. Avila</u>,
192 Wis. 2d 870, 890, 532 N.W.2d 423, 430 (1995) <u>overruled by</u> <u>State
v. Gordon</u>, 2003 WI 69, 262 Wis. 2d 380, 663 N.W.2d 765 on other grounds.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoEndnoteText">
<br /></div>
</div>
</div>
<br />
The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-57096859070982760172011-07-04T09:27:00.000-05:002011-07-04T09:28:25.306-05:00The End of Something<div><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span class="Apple-style-span" ><span style="mso-tab-count:1"> </span>I will be discontinuing regular posts to this blog. I will post intermittently when something moves me. I have written what I needed to write and have learned much. However, empirical science moves slowly. It takes time to complete an empirical study and much more time to verify the study with other studies to discern any truth. (Not to mention that there are studies that are just plain nonsense from a methodological perspective and from the conclusions drawn from the statistics.)</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in"><span class="Apple-style-span" ><span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>I desire not to waste your time or mine with writing things because I feel compelled to write a blog entry rather than because I have something I feel worth communicating. <span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>Therefore, if you are interested, you may want to have the blog sent to you via e-mail. I will now spend the rest of my summer free-time reading, riding my bicycle, and playing music. Have a great summer.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span class="Apple-style-span" > </span></o:p></p></div><span class="Apple-style-span" >The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.</span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-13339576566535719652011-07-04T09:11:00.002-05:002011-07-04T09:13:47.113-05:00To Win an Argument or to Find the Truth<div style="text-indent: 48px;"><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: x-large; ">A </span><span class="Apple-style-span"><span class="Apple-style-span">recent theory of argumentation that has been generating considerable discussion states that the human reason has so many cognitive biases and other flaws because reason evolved for the purpose of winning arguments through persuasion and not as a means of discovering knowledge and making better decisions.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/To%20Win%20an%20Argument%20or%20to%20Find%20the%20Truth.docx#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">[i]</span></span></span></span></a> These researchers argue that the existence of such cognitive biases, most powerfully represented by confirmation bias, the tendency to view evidence in way that confirms one’s prior views, makes sense only if one views the evolution of human reason for the purpose of winning arguments rather than discovering knowledge. If discovering knowledge was the primary purpose, our reasoning ability would not be as flawed as it is.</span></span></div><span class="Apple-style-span"><span class="Apple-style-span"><div><span class="Apple-style-span"> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in">The paper is worth the read for anyone interested in the process of reasoning. As for confirmation bias, unfortunately it appears that this error in thought has been elevated to a creed within our political system. One only has to ask a devout Republican and a Democrat (or those associated with each party) to explain their perspective on an issue to see confirmation bias in full action. To allow even the potential correctness of the other side’s position is considered weakness and rejection for being an apostate—a logical result of a system driven by a hypercompetitive desire to prevail at a ballot box rather than to solve problems.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in">The authors explain that all hope for an actual conversation leading to knowledge is not lost. These researchers state that “people are quite capable of reasoning in an unbiased manner, or at least when they are evaluating arguments rather than producing them, and when they are after the truth rather than trying to win a debate.”<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn2" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/To%20Win%20an%20Argument%20or%20to%20Find%20the%20Truth.docx#_edn2" name="_ednref2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Those of us in decision making positions that affect others would better serve our society by really listening to others, and not only to find the errors in other’s arguments, but to also find any potential truths that expose the errors in our perceptions and thoughts.</p> <div style="mso-element:endnote-list"><!--[if !supportEndnotes]--><br /><hr align="left" size="1" width="33%"> <!--[endif]--> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn1"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn1" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/To%20Win%20an%20Argument%20or%20to%20Find%20the%20Truth.docx#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Mercier, Hugo, and Dan Sperber, BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34, 57 –111; <a href="http://www.dan.sperber.fr/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/MercierSperberWhydohumansreason.pdf">http://www.dan.sperber.fr/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/MercierSperberWhydohumansreason.pdf</a></p> </div> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn2"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn2" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/To%20Win%20an%20Argument%20or%20to%20Find%20the%20Truth.docx#_ednref2" name="_edn2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Ibid. p. 72.</p> </div></div></span></div>The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.</span></span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-50729097514461847182011-06-20T12:00:00.003-05:002011-06-21T05:17:49.923-05:00Psychology and ConfessionsNeuroscientist David Eagleman, in his book Incognito, describes the human brain as a team of rivals in which various parties in the brain can compete with each other to create a sense of being “conflicted”. He also discusses research that shows that keeping secrets is unhealthy for the brain. Simply stated, he says, a secret is a competition within the brain between telling someone something or not telling them it. This tension is what makes something a secret. He states that secret agents and spies are probably equipped with a strong module for withholding secrets. In contrast, based on the high percentages of confessions in juvenile delinquent cases, it doesn’t appear to me that juveniles have much ability to keep a secret.<br /><br />Which brings me to the law of confessions. I never believed that the law regarding whether or not a confession was voluntary made much sense. What does it mean to say that “pressures brought to bear on the defendant by representatives of the State exceeded the defendant’s ability to resist”? Except for those defendants who turn themselves into police and actually volunteer a report of their transgressions, almost any confession is the result of pressures brought to bear on the defendant by the police that exceeded the defendant’s ability to resist. That is why they confessed.<br /><br />Asking some defendants the question, “Did they commit the crime?” is sufficient pressure to exceed their ability to resist, so they confess. That statement would not and should not be considered “involuntary”.<br /><br />Further, it is stated that the confession must be “a product of a free and unconstrained will.” This formulation requires that there is some entity (apparently called the “will”) that operates as a cause without a cause or as the “ghost in the machine” or the “soul.”<br /><br />I could never figure out how one would evaluate whether or not another person's confession was the product of a free and unconstrained will. How does one get access to another’s will, except by projecting one’s own conception of their own “will” onto another?<br /><br />The concept of having a “will” is a cultural and religious construct. For example, some Christian denominations believe in the possibility of “free-will” while others don’t. Buddhists view the concept of having a self as an error in thought.<br /><br />Instead of looking into some metaphysical conception such as someone’s will, the law would be clearer if the inquiry would be simply reduced to two formulations that encompass the law regarding confessions. The first question is: Were the tactics the State used to obtain the confession incompatible with the values of our society as they relate to a citizen’s relationship with the State? For example, the intentional infliction of physical pain or the threatening of harm to force a confession is clearly incompatible with what we believe is proper behavior a State actor should take toward a citizen. If the tactics were incompatible with societal values, the confession is suppressed.<br /><br />The second question is: Was the confession obtained unduly unreliable? If it is, the confession is suppressed. In many instances, an unreliable confession will be the result of coercive police conduct with a defendant who is susceptible to providing a false confession. However, Courts have found confessions to be “involuntary” under circumstances where the confession was obtained from an inordinately susceptible individual with very little police encouragement. See for example, State v. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43. The focus should be an evaluation of the unreliability of the confession. The exclusion of unreliable confessions increases the accuracy of the determination of guilt within our criminal justice system.<br /><br />A focus on proper police conduct and on a statement’s reliability would get the Courts out of pretending to be able to divine what someone’s “will” was (what about that defendant whose will was to confess but other demons in the mind were not allowing him to do so—could any amount of coercion make his statement “involuntary?) and when that “will” was overcome by police pressure resulting in a confession that is not the product of a free and unconstrained will.<br /><br />The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-19202689282967724332011-06-13T11:27:00.001-05:002011-06-13T11:29:39.731-05:00David Eagleman Speaks on NeurolawHere are a couple of videos of David Eagleman speaking about law and neuroscience.<br /><br /><a href="http://eaglemanlab.net/neurolaw">http://eaglemanlab.net/neurolaw</a><br /><br />The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-812769690895629852011-06-13T09:39:00.001-05:002011-06-13T09:41:13.928-05:00The Brain as a Team of Rivals<span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:180%;">David Eagleman, in his recent book, Incognito, The Secret Lives of the Brain, argues that the brain is composed of various modules, some with competing objectives, comprising a “team of rivals”. </span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:180%;">Eagleman, a neuroscientist at Baylor College of Medicine and director of the Initiative on Neuroscience and the Law, further argues that “blame-worthiness” in the criminal justice system is the wrong question. He persuasively argues that as the understanding of the brain advances, including our understanding of the neurological bases for much deviant behavior, behavior for which defendants had been considered “blameworthy” now lead to legal findings of “not-blameworthy.” </span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:180%;">Eagleman argues that the only question is whether the behavior of the defendant can be modified. If it can, then rehabilitation, sometimes in the form of punishment, is appropriate. If the behavior is not modifiable, then a defendant should be warehoused in a place where he or she cannot harm the public.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:180%;">Eagleman’s perspective on the criminal justice system is purely scientific, and his conclusions logically flow from this perspective. However, as I have argued in other entries in this blog, the criminal justice system is not merely a treatment system, but a social and political institution built on a society’s history and beliefs including religious beliefs—many of which are antithetical to scientific findings and the scientific method. The use of science in the law has sociological limits.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:180%;">Eagleman’s book addresses many of questions involved in deciphering human behavior and is a must read for anyone involved in the criminal justice system or engaged in any undertaking that involves the modification of human behavior. </span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-68712142904304834452011-06-05T16:05:00.001-05:002011-06-05T16:07:06.987-05:00Looks Matter<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in"><span class="Apple-style-span" >Several studies have examined the relationship between the physical attractiveness of a defendant and jury verdicts. One study found that defendants who were considered physically attractive by the jurors were treated more leniently by the jurors and those that were considered physically unattractive were treated more harshly by the jurors.<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn1" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Looks%20Count.docx#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in"><span class="Apple-style-span" >Another study found that defendants who were considered physically attractive were almost twice as likely to be acquitted than those considered unattractive.<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn2" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Looks%20Count.docx#_edn2" name="_ednref2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in"><span class="Apple-style-span" >Finally, a researcher looked at the effect of the physical attractiveness of a victim on a jury’s verdict in a car theft case. His research showed that a defendant was judged more harshly when the victim was physically attractive than when the victim was physically unattractive provided the victim was also careful in attempting to prevent the theft.<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn3" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Looks%20Count.docx#_edn3" name="_ednref3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[iii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span class="Apple-style-span" ><span style="mso-tab-count:1"> </span>Now all of the above studies involved the use of mock juries. Whether or not these same patterns would hold in an actual trial is another question. However, the studies do indicate yet another potential prejudice of which we need to be vigilant. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span class="Apple-style-span" > </span></o:p></p> <div style="mso-element:endnote-list"><!--[if !supportEndnotes]--><span class="Apple-style-span" ><br /> </span><hr align="left" width="33%"> <!--[endif]--> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn1"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span" ><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn1" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Looks%20Count.docx#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Izzett, R.E. & Leginski, W. (1974). Group discussion and the influence of defendant characteristics in a simulated jury setting. <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal">The Journal of Social Psychology</i>, 93, 271-279.</span></p> </div> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn2"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span" ><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn2" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Looks%20Count.docx#_ednref2" name="_edn2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> MacCoun, R.J. (1990). The emergence of extralegal bias during jury deliberations. <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal">Criminal Justice and Behavior</i>, 17, 303-314.</span></p> </div> </div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn3" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Looks%20Count.docx#_ednref3" name="_edn3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[iii]</span></span></span></span></a> Kerr, Norbert L., (1978), Beautiful and Blameless: Effects of Victim Attractiveness and Responsibility on Mock Jurors’ Verdicts, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal">Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin</i>, Vol. 4, No. 3.</span><div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><br /></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" >The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.</span></div>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-59318648608924865582011-05-30T06:05:00.000-05:002011-05-30T06:07:00.259-05:00Racial Bias and Judicial Decisions<span class="Apple-style-span" ><div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in">Racial bias and prejudice should have no place in a judicial decision. How good are judges at excluding this pernicious tendency from their deliberations? <span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>Researchers attempted to evaluate this question.<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn1" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Racial%20Bias%20and%20Judicial%20Decisions.docx#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi; mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in">These researchers explain that two types of potential bias exist can exist in the courtroom. The first is explicit bias which is bias that people are aware of and sometimes openly acknowledge. With cultural change, explicit bias has decreased and is certainly unacceptable within the judiciary.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in">The second type of bias is implicit bias which is bias that one may not be aware of and that operates at the unconscious level. Various techniques have been designed to measure implicit bias. One such technique is the Implicit Association Test (IAT) which measures the association between a race and words such as good/bad. (For several such tests see for example, <a href="https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/">https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/</a> )</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in">The Rachlinski study showed the judges who were tested (from various geographical locations around the U.S.) had a strong white preference on the IAT test. The black judges showed no strong racial preference.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in">These researchers that attempted to discover whether measures of strong white preference in the IAT impact judicial decision making. The judges were asked to make judicial decisions involving the criminal justice system in three different cases. These questions involved a determination of the guilt of the individual as well as the appropriate disposition. The judges were primed to understand the race of the defendant. The results of this test showed that the judges’ decisions, on the average, were not affected with the race of the defendant.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in">However, the researchers discovered that judges who had a white preference in the IAT test gave higher sentences to black defendants and judges who had a black preference in the IAT test gave higher sentences to white defendants.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in">These researchers came to the following conclusions. “First, judges, like the rest of us, carry implicit biases concerning race. Second, these implicit biases can affect judges’ judgment, at least in context where judges are unaware of a need to monitor their decisions for racial bias. Third, and conversely, when judges are aware of a need to monitor their own responses for the influence of implicit racial biases, are motivated to suppress that bias, they appear able to do so.”<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn2" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Racial%20Bias%20and%20Judicial%20Decisions.docx#_edn2" name="_ednref2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi; mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in">A judicial decision (or any decision within the criminal justice system) should never be affected by racial bias. Those of us in within the justice system must never tolerate explicit bias, and must be alert to, and guard against, implicit bias. The research would indicate if we are aware of our biases, and are committed to an unbiased decision, we have a reasonable likelihood at being successful in making unbiased decisions.</p> <div style="mso-element:endnote-list"><!--[if !supportEndnotes]--><br /> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%"> <!--[endif]--> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn1"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn1" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Racial%20Bias%20and%20Judicial%20Decisions.docx#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Rachlinski, Jeffrey J., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich, and Chris Guthrie, 2009, Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 84:3 pp. 1195-1246</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn2"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn2" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Racial%20Bias%20and%20Judicial%20Decisions.docx#_ednref2" name="_edn2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Ibid, p. 1221</p> </div></div></span></div>The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.</span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-80646867650910972732011-05-15T14:57:00.001-05:002011-05-15T14:59:26.840-05:00Thoughts of Death May Increase Desire to Punish<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Terror management theory (TMT) posits that fear of death can strongly influence human behavior, including behavior within the courtroom.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>The theory starts with the hypothesis that when humans confront their own mortality, they are comforted by a belief that they share with others a stable world-view of various values. This world-view may be a transcendent religious view, or a this-world, shared sense of community values. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Multiple studies have been completed that show that when humans are reminded of their death, they have a tendency to want to protect, defend, and enforce their world-views. This tendency holds for decisions made in a courtroom—generally resulting in more punitive decisions.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Research has shown that when judges are reminded of their mortality, they will impose higher bail than judges who have not been reminded of their own mortality. Juries will have a greater tendency to convict on lesser evidence and recommend more severe sentences after being reminded of their mortality. People also can become more physically aggressive against those who threaten their world-views when they are reminded of their own mortality.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Research has shown that TMT can lead people being more lenient rather than punitive when it is the victim of the crime that threatens one’s world-view—any experienced criminal defense attorney understands this.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Terror management theory is another mechanism that those in the criminal justice system must be aware of. While advocates may attempt to exploit this phenomenon, judges must be on guard to protect against any undue influence on their or a jury’s decision from thoughts of one’s mortality.<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn1" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Thoughts%20of%20Death%20May%20Increase%20Desire%20to%20Punish.docx#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a></span></p> <div style="mso-element:endnote-list"><!--[if !supportEndnotes]--><span class="Apple-style-span">The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.<br /> </span><hr align="left" size="1" width="33%"> <!--[endif]--> </div><span class="Apple-style-span"><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn1" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Thoughts%20of%20Death%20May%20Increase%20Desire%20to%20Punish.docx#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[i]</span></span></span></span></a> Arndt, Jamie, Joel Lieverman, Alison Cook, (2005), <i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal">Terror Management In the Courtroom: Exploring the Effects of Mortality Salience on Legal Decision Making</i>, 11 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 407, pp. 407-437/</span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-67439865131040583882011-05-09T05:49:00.000-05:002011-05-09T05:50:17.546-05:00Judges May Not Be Able to Close the Valves of Their Attention<div><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >Emily Dickinson believed that the soul is able to “Close the valves of her attention like stone.” Is this ability limited to the ethereal world, or do judges also have this ability? As discussed in the last entry, the research shows that jurors find it difficult putting inadmissible information out of their minds when deliberating on a verdict. What does the research say about judges’ ability to do this?</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span" ><span style="mso-tab-count:1"> </span>Researchers examined this question by testing a group of judges with a series of questions.<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn1" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Judges%20May%20Not%20Be%20Able%20to%20Close%20the%20Valves%20of%20Their%20Attention.docx#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> The first scenario looked at the effect of judge’s exposure to settlement discussions on their ultimate award of damages. One group of judges learned that the plaintiff is requesting $175,000 in damages. Another group of judges learned that the plaintiff is requesting $10 million in damages.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>Each group of judges is paired with another group that is not involved in the settlement discussions. Judges are warned not to use the information gleaned from the settlement discussions in their ultimate determination of damages. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >The group of judges that are exposed to the $175,000 anchor (see <a href="http://bauersteven.blogspot.com/2011/02/anchoring-and-adjustment.html">Anchoring and Adjustment</a> ) awarded damages averaging $612,000 compared to $1.4 million for the group of judges who were not exposed to the anchor.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>The group of judges that are exposed to the $10-million anchor awarded damages averaging $2.2 million compared to $808,000 for the group of judges who were not exposed to the anchor.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>The differences were statistically significant. The judges were not able to disregard the information they learned from the settlement discussions.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >The second scenario involved judges deciding a contract dispute. Half of the judges had to rule on a discovery dispute involving the attorney/client privilege which included an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal">in camera</i> examination of a letter between the plaintiff and his/her attorney. The letter greatly weakened the case for the plaintiff. <span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>For the control group of judges, who were not exposed to the letter, 55.6% ruled for the plaintiff. Only 29.2% of the judges who were exposed to the letter and found it privileged, found for the plaintiff. Of the judges who were exposed to the letter and did not find it privileged (and therefore could consider it as evidence) only 25% found for the plaintiff. The 29.2% and the 25% were not statistically significant from each other. Again, it appears that judges were not able to put the privileged materials out of their minds when deciding the case. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >The third scenario involved a court trial of a criminal sexual assault charge. The issue was consent. One set of judges had to rule on a pretrial <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal">motion</i> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal">in limine</i> regarding the complaining witness’s prior sexual history for being promiscuous. The controls were not exposed to this information regarding the complaining witness.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>About 49% of the judges who had not been exposed to the information, found the defendant guilty, whereas 20% of the judges who had been exposed to the information about the victim and who had found it inadmissible, found the defendant guilty.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>(Only 7.7% of the judges who were exposed to the information and found it admissible convicted the defendant. However, because of the small sample size it was not significantly different from 20 %.) Again, it appeared that judges, on the average, could not keep the inadmissible evidence out of their decision making process.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >The fourth scenario involved judges again making a determination of damages in a personal injury case. One set of judges were told that the plaintiff had a prior conviction involving swindling elderly people out of their life savings in an investment scheme. This was inadmissible evidence. Those judges, who learned of the plaintiff’s conviction, awarded 12% less than the judges who didn’t learn of this information. The difference was marginally statistically significant.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>Judges did not appear to be as affected by this information in this decision.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >The fifth scenario involves sentencing a defendant. Some condemning information was received from the defendant through a cooperation agreement. The information was ruled inadmissible. The set of judges who were not exposed to this information sentenced the defendant to 78 months in prison. The judges who were exposed to the information, and had found the condemning information inadmissible, sentenced the defendant to an average of 85.9 months in prison. Again, it appears that the prohibited information was used in the judicial decision.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >The sixth scenario involved one group of judges making a decision on whether or not to find probable cause for a search warrant, and the other group of judges having to make the same decision, but this time during a suppression motion evaluating the same facts after the police did the search and found a large amount of drugs. (The police had clear authority to search without a warrant under the circumstances of the scenario, provided they had probable cause.) About 24% of the judges would have issued the warrant, and about 28% would have found probable cause at the suppression hearing. The differences were not statistically significant. Judges appeared to be able to keep the fact that drugs were found, which is not relevant to the inquiry, out of their minds.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >The seventh scenario involved judges again deciding the guilt of a defendant. One set of judges heard a suppression motion on a statement of the defendant where he confessed to the crime. The statement was inadmissibly obtained and suppressed by the court. Of the judges that did not hear the suppressed evidence, 17.7% of the judges convicted the defendant. Of the judges who had heard the suppression motion, 20.7% of the judges convicted the defendant. Again, these two conviction rates were not statistically significant from each other. Again, judges appear to have been able to keep the inadmissible information from affecting their decision.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >This research casts some doubt on whether or not judges have the ability to “close the valves of their attention like stone”. It appears that this closure, under many scenarios, is more like cotton cloth than stone. </span></p> <div style="mso-element:endnote-list"><!--[if !supportEndnotes]--><span class="Apple-style-span" ><br /> </span><hr align="left" width="33%"> <!--[endif]--> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn1"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span" ><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn1" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Judges%20May%20Not%20Be%20Able%20to%20Close%20the%20Valves%20of%20Their%20Attention.docx#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Wistrich, Andrew J., Guthrie, Chris, and Rachilinski, (2005),<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal">Can judges ignore inadmissible information? The difficulty of deliberately disregarding</i>, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 153, pp 1251-1345.</span></p> </div></div></div><span class="Apple-style-span" >The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.</span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-59325116346211606782011-05-02T05:53:00.002-05:002011-05-02T06:01:56.033-05:00Do Not Consider this Entry for Any Purpose<div><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Jurors are often asked whether or not they can put aside what they heard or saw about a case and decide the case fairly and impartially based only upon the evidence presented at trial. In highly publicized cases, often jurors who had been exposed to pretrial publicity remain on a jury, after assuring all that they will remain “fair and impartial.” Jurors are also often instructed to “disregard that answer” or to use evidence in one way, but not for any other purpose, such as with “other-acts” evidence. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Are jurors able to follow these instructions? Empirical studies do not support the conclusion that they can. Researchers exposed mock jurors to different levels of two types of incriminating pretrial evidence—either factually oriented or emotionally oriented. They further measured the effect of time after exposure to that evidence on any bias resulting from the pretrial publicity. They found that the passage of time between the exposure to the pretrial publicity and the trial reduced any biasing effects of the publicity for factually oriented material. However, they did not find that this delay reduced the biasing effect of emotionally laden pretrial publicity.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Please%20Disregard%20This%20Entry.docx#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 150%; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">This research was replicated using videotaped and written pretrial publicity. No differences were found in the biasing effect of either videotaped or written pretrial publicity. Further, these researchers did not find a difference in the biasing effects of factually oriented pretrial publicity and emotionally laden pretrial publicity.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Please%20Disregard%20This%20Entry.docx#_edn2" name="_ednref2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 150%; ">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Research regarding trial instructions to disregard certain evidence, or to use certain evidence in limited ways is mixed. Research that looked at the disclosure of the defendant’s criminal history show that evidence of prior convictions did not necessarily increase the conviction rate. If the convictions were for similar conduct, then jurors were not able to keep it from influencing their verdicts. Some research shows that the deliberation process may assuage the effects of inadmissible evidence on juror bias. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">One study looked at the type of instructions the judge used to inform the jury not to consider a statement of the defendant. A jury informed not to regard the statement because it was illegally obtained was less likely to follow the admonition than a jury informed not to regard the statement because the quality of the tape was too poor.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Please%20Disregard%20This%20Entry.docx#_edn3" name="_ednref3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 150%; ">[iii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">One finding in the research related to admonitions to disregard evidence is what is called the “back-fire effect”. The “back-fire effect” is when a jury pays more attention to evidence that they are instructed not to consider than if they were not so instructed. The explanation for the exclusion of the evidence appears to impact whether or not a jury will heed judicial instructions to disregard the evidence. There is some evidence to support the idea if the exclusion of the evidence is based on the unreliability of the evidence, such as hearsay, jurors will be more likely to heed the judicial instruction.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">There are many psychological theories as to why jurors will not disregard, or are not capable of disregarding, inadmissible evidence. One of the more common and interesting theories is the production of a reactance in jurors. Reactance theory maintains that when a people are told that they cannot do something that they believe they should be able to do, they react to this prohibition by increasing their determination to engage in the behavior.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Please%20Disregard%20This%20Entry.docx#_edn4" name="_ednref4" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 150%; ">[iv]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">The research regarding the ability of a jury to disregard various inadmissible evidence shows that there is reason to believe that they often can’t. I don’t think this conclusion is anything that surprises anyone experienced in the court room. It does provide us with a warning to redouble our efforts to minimize a jury’s exposure to inadmissible evidence, and to not be misguided by fictions that believe that a limiting instruction can cure everything.</span></p> <div><!--[if !supportEndnotes]--><span class="Apple-style-span"><br /> </span><hr align="left" width="33%"> <!--[endif]--> <div id="edn1"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Please%20Disregard%20This%20Entry.docx#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 150%; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Kramer, G.P., Kerr, N.L. & Carroll, J.S. (1990). Pretrial publicity, judicial remedies, and jury bias. <i>Law and Human Behavior</i>, 14, 4009-438.</span></p> </div> <div id="edn2"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Please%20Disregard%20This%20Entry.docx#_ednref2" name="_edn2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 150%; ">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Wilson, J.R & Bornstein, B.H. (1998). Methodological consideration in pretrial publicity research. Is the medium the message? Law and Human Behavior, 22, 585-598.</span></p> </div> <div id="edn3"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Please%20Disregard%20This%20Entry.docx#_ednref3" name="_edn3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 150%; ">[iii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Kassin, S.M., & Sommers, S.R. (1997). Inadmissible testimony, instructions to disregard, and the jury: Substantive versus procedural considerations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 1046-1054.</span></p> </div> <div id="edn4"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Please%20Disregard%20This%20Entry.docx#_ednref4" name="_edn4" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 150%; ">[iv]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Lieberman, Joel D. and Arndt, Jamie (2000). Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions, Psychology, Public Policy and the Law, Vol 6, No. 3 677-711.</span></p> </div></div></div><span class="Apple-style-span">The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.</span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-65305313790045410112011-04-24T22:21:00.002-05:002011-04-24T22:24:08.445-05:00The Danger of Other-Acts Evidence<div><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><o:p></o:p><span style="mso-tab-count:1"><span class="Apple-style-span"></span></span><span class="Apple-style-span"> The rules of evidence generally prohibit the use of “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” to prove someone’s character to show that the person acted in conformity with their character. Other crimes, wrongs or acts can be admitted to prove such things as motive, opportunity, intent, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Incoherence%20of%20Other%20Acts%20Evidence.docx#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">[i]</span></span></span></a> The jury instruction on “other-acts” evidence concludes: “<span style="letter-spacing:-.15pt">You may not consider this evidence to conclude that the defendant has a certain character or a certain character trait and that the defendant acted in conformity with that trait or character with respect to the offense charged in this case.”</span></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent: .5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">This evidentiary rule has generated more confusion than most rules within the legal community among jurors, lawyers, and judges. I believe the reason for the confusion is that the rule works against how humans actually make many decisions, and the stated exceptions to the rule can be read to essentially negate the rule. However, I also believe the rule is needed to provide a fair trial of factual issues.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent: .5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">The rule is attempting to proscribe evidence that one has a certain character and then acted in conformity with this character. Character is defined as the aggregate of features and traits that form <a href="http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/the"><span style="color:windowtext; text-decoration:none;text-underline:none">the</span></a> individual <a href="http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/nature"><span style="color:windowtext; text-decoration:none;text-underline:none">nature</span></a> of some person or thing; or any trait, function, structure, or substance of an organism resulting from the effect of one or more genes as modified by the environment.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Incoherence%20of%20Other%20Acts%20Evidence.docx#_edn2" name="_ednref2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent: .5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">One cannot stare into someone’s eyes and divine a person’s character. The only way to judge a person’s character is to observe the individual’s behaviors and then inductively construct it. For example, one considers that the person was convicted of burglary in the past, and then one reasons that this person has the character for dishonesty and thievery when he or she is confronted with a certain set of circumstances. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent: .5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">To speak about someone’s character and acting in conformity with the character, one must think of a human as some sort of a probabilistic input/output device. First, based on the prior behavior of the subject individual, the evaluator must infer someone’s character. Then one must assume that if someone has this type of character, that when confronted with a set of environmental stimuli, he or she will be more likely to act in a certain way, i.e. provide a certain output, than an individual without that character. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent: .5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">For example, the probability to commit a burglary is a function of the probability that a person will be confronted with the environmental stimulus to burgle multiplied by the probability that one has the character to burgle if confronted with such environmental stimulus. Research shows that the probability that a person with a history of committing crimes or involving themselves with other anti-social behavior will commit another crime is higher than for a person without such history. Therefore, the character evidence of a history or prior convictions or other anti-social activity is evidence that tends to make more probable the defendant’s guilt than a person without such history.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Incoherence%20of%20Other%20Acts%20Evidence.docx#_edn3" name="_ednref3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">[iii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent: .5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated that: “Evidence of other crimes and misdeeds is not excluded because of an inherent lack of probative value, but is withheld as a precaution against inciting prejudice.” The Court further held that two reasons that character evidence is excluded are: “The over strong tendency to believe the defendant guilty of the charge merely because he is a person likely to do such acts” and the “tendency to condemn not because he is believed guilty of the present charge but because he has escaped punishment from other offenses.”<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Incoherence%20of%20Other%20Acts%20Evidence.docx#_edn4" name="_ednref4" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">[iv]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent: .5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Humans make decision based on heuristics—rules that make difficult decisions easier. One such heuristic is that people have character and act in accordance to that character. People say: “Don’t trust Joe, because he is a crook.” They avoid Joe and don’t get hurt and the warning seemed to work, although they probably wouldn’t have gotten hurt if they had trusted him. This heuristic is a quick and easy way to avoid problem individuals. It is related to the same heuristic that classifies people by such things as race, sex, national origin, and all other such classification schemes that are many times erroneous, and often pernicious.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent: .5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Coupled with this heuristic is the human inability to accurately calculate probabilities. The additional probative value of the character evidence is probably far less than what most people imagine. For most people, knowing someone has been convicted of a crime in the past, <u>feels</u> like strong evidence against that person in another accusation. A defendant with a history of criminal offenses is more likely to offend than someone who doesn’t have that history, but most of the people with a prior conviction will not re-offend. And predictions of whether or not a defendant has committed a crime, often based on merely one past crime, will often be wrong. The additional probative value of “other-acts” evidence on the question of whether or not a defendant re-offended is, in most cases, relatively low. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent: .5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Also, as emotions are central to human decision making and not separate from them, any emotional response elicited from the “other-acts” evidence (or for that matter any evidence) in a criminal case will impact the likelihood of conviction. Anyone with any experience trying cases understands the need for an emotional edge to win a case. Emotions often lead the rational thought process.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent: .5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Humans also have an innate need to punish actions that result in harm and wrongful acts. If a defendant had not been punished (or in the eyes of the jury insufficiently punished) for the other bad acts, then the potential risk that a jury would convict a defendant because of unpunished “bad-acts” is greater than if these acts already had been sufficiently punished. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent: .5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">The exceptions to the exclusion of “other-acts” evidence attempt to confine their use to situations where the “other-acts” evidence has a great deal of probative value on an issue of the trial other than just propensity evidence. But when one starts getting into issues such as general motive and intent, it is easy, and often inevitable to slide or plop, into propensity evidence. According to the jury instructions motive <span style="mso-bidi-font-size:13.0pt;line-height:200%">refers to a person's reason for doing something and intent is whether the defendant acted with the state of mind required for the offense. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent: .5in;line-height:200%"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:13.0pt;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">For example, in a child sexual assault case, the State will argue that the defendant’s motive for touching a child was “to obtain sexual gratification from a child”, and his intent was to become sexually gratified, and that a prior similar sexual assault of a different child is admitted into evidence to prove both. The jury instruction on “other-acts” tells the jury that the prior act can only be used on the issues of motive and intent. Why is the prior act probative of the issue of motive and intent? Because of the argument, if he did it before, it is more unlikely that the touching was inadvertent or accidental due to the “law of chances”. If such touching happened once, it may have been from an unlikely, inadvertent or accidental touching. However, if it happened twice, the probability of an inadvertent or accidental touching on both occasions becomes much more unlikely. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent: .5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:13.0pt;line-height:200%">If the defendant’s touching wasn’t inadvertent or accidental, then why did the defendant touch the child? Because the defendant touched the child to intentionally obtain sexual gratification. As intent is an element of the crime, the other-acts evidence is certainly being used to prove that </span><span style="letter-spacing:-.15pt">the defendant acted in conformity with his character (being sexually attracted to children) with respect to the offense charged.</span><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 13.0pt;line-height:200%"> The issues (not to mention the jury instruction on “other-acts”) get muddied and contradictory quite quickly.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent: .5in;line-height:200%"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:13.0pt;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">If the “other-acts” evidence is offered for, and relative to, an acceptable purpose, then the Court weighs whether or not the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by things such as unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. The inclusion or exclusion of “other-acts” evidence is ultimately a balancing between allowing a jury to hear evidence that will more likely lead them to a finding of guilt when, without the evidence, it would not make that finding, or excluding the “other-acts” evidence resulting in the jury being more likely to acquit, when with the evidence, it would have found the defendant guilty. The rules regarding “other-acts” evidence, like many of the rules in the criminal justice system, involves a choice between type one error, which is a convicting a defendant for a crime he or she didn’t commit, and type two error, which is acquitting a defendant when in fact the defendant was guilty. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent: .5in;line-height:200%"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:13.0pt;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Based on research regarding human decision making, the human need to punish, the inability of humans to correctly assess probabilities, and the uncertain assessment of the probability that a defendant actually committed a crime based on the defendant’s past, it is essential that the trial court act as the gatekeeper to the evidence a jury hears, to ensure that a fair assessment of the facts will be made by the jury. The danger of unfair prejudice urging a conviction despite the evidence is heightened under the circumstances where the “other-acts” evidence ignites the desire to punish, specifically in those instances of “other-acts” conduct that are inordinately heinous, especially relative to the charged conduct, and where the “other-acts” conduct was unpunished or insufficiently punished. The trial court has the power and tools to limit and circumscribe the use of “other-acts” evidence—to allow what facts are necessary to prove the purpose for the evidence, but to exclude those facts that may arouse the human desire to punish and that may prevent factual issues from being fairly determined.</span></span></p> <div><!--[if !supportEndnotes]--><span class="Apple-style-span"><br /> </span><hr align="left" width="33%"> <!--[endif]--> <div id="edn1"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Incoherence%20of%20Other%20Acts%20Evidence.docx#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Wis. Stat. §904.04(2)(a).</span></p> </div> <div id="edn2"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Incoherence%20of%20Other%20Acts%20Evidence.docx#_ednref2" name="_edn2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Dictionary.com</span></p> </div> <div id="edn3"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Incoherence%20of%20Other%20Acts%20Evidence.docx#_ednref3" name="_edn3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">[iii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> See Wis. Stat. §904.01.</span></p> </div> <div id="edn4"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Incoherence%20of%20Other%20Acts%20Evidence.docx#_ednref4" name="_edn4" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">[iv]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> <i>State v. Evers</i>, 139 Wis. 2d 424, 407 N.W.2d 256 (1987). This case is a great exposition on “other-acts.”</span></p> </div></div></div><span class="Apple-style-span">The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.</span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-20030795162714016732011-04-18T05:35:00.001-05:002011-04-18T05:42:04.369-05:00Emotions and Decisions<div><span class="Apple-style-span"><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%">Inherent in many legal rules is the ideal of a human as a rational and unemotional decision-maker.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>For example, we instruct the jury not to be “swayed by sympathy, prejudice, or passion”. We attempt to ascertain whether or not a confession was the result of “a rational intellect and a free will.” We are required to decide whether evidence should be excluded because the evidence “appeals to the jury’s sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish” or has a “tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, commonly, although not necessarily, an emotional one.” </p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%">The concerns that these rules attempt to address are legitimate, but the conception of human actors as rational decision-makers is, most likely, erroneous. This misconception is a foundation of neo-classical economics, and through the law and economics movement, this erroneous view has been further reinforced within the law. </p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%">David Brooks, in his recent book, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal">The Social Animal</i>, discusses this misconception. According to Brooks, the view of humans as rational, logical thinkers was the product of the French Enlightenment “led by thinkers like Descartes, Rousseau, Voltaire, and Condorcet.”<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn1" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Emotions%20and%20Decisions.docx#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi; mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Brooks contrasts them with the English Enlightenment thinkers of David Hume, Adam Smith, and Edmund Burke who more clearly understood the role of emotion in being human. Brooks quotes Hume: “Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” </p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%">The research regarding human decision- making puts emotions at its center. A decision is not a calculation of sums, but an intuitive, partly subconscious resolution.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>According to Brooks, “It is nonsensical to talk about rational thought without unconscious thought” as rational thought is built upon the unconscious thought.<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn2" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Emotions%20and%20Decisions.docx#_edn2" name="_ednref2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi; mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Unconscious thought, although at times extremely good at making correct decisions, can also lead us astray in our decision making. I attempted to address some of those problems of thinking in earlier blog entries.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%">Jonah Lehrer, in his book “<i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal">How We Decide</i>” discusses how emotions play a central role in decision making. Plato analogized human reason as a charioteer driving one well-mannered horse and also an ill-mannered horse of the emotions. Plato was wrong again. Lehrer describes research regarding a brain damaged subject who is unable to make a decision. Lehrer writes: “For too long, people have disparaged the emotional brain, blaming our feelings for all of our mistakes. The truth is far more interesting.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>What we discover when we look at the brain is that the horses and charioteer depend upon each other. If it weren’t for our emotions, reason wouldn’t exist at all.”<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn3" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Emotions%20and%20Decisions.docx#_edn3" name="_ednref3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi; mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA">[iii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%">Lehrer’s book has many interesting ideas, including the type of intelligence required to be an outstanding professional quarterback (It isn’t superior rational skill, and for some of the reasons discussed in his book, I was glad the Packers had Aaron Rodgers at quarterback during the last Super Bowl rather than Brett Favre.).<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>Emotions are central to many decisions, including complex decisions, such as that which jurors often face during a trial.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%">Brooks’ book discusses research on human behavior in many different contexts. Although the book is structured on the somewhat corny life stories of fictional characters Raymond and Erica, it’s an easy, but worthwhile, read for anyone interested in human behavior.</p> <div style="mso-element:endnote-list"><!--[if !supportEndnotes]--><br /> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%"> <!--[endif]--> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn1"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn1" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Emotions%20and%20Decisions.docx#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Brooks, David, 2011, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal">The Social Animal—The Hidden Sources of Love Character and Achievement, </i>Random House, N.Y., p. 233-34.</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn2"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn2" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Emotions%20and%20Decisions.docx#_ednref2" name="_edn2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Ibid, p. 239</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn3"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn3" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Emotions%20and%20Decisions.docx#_ednref3" name="_edn3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">[iii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Lehrer, Jonah, 2009, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal">How We Decide</i>, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, N.Y., N.Y. p13</p> </div></div></span></div><span class="Apple-style-span">The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.</span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-27746641899500189082011-04-03T19:05:00.004-05:002011-04-03T20:15:03.401-05:00The Problem(s) with Memory-Part Three<div><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">In my last two entries, I discussed five of the seven “sins of memory” identified by Daniel L. Schacter in his book, <i>The Seven Sins of Memory, How the Mind Forgets and Remembers</i>. I will now discuss the last two sins.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">The sixth “sin of memory” is bias. According to Schacter, bias “refers to distorting influences of our present knowledge, beliefs, and feelings on new experiences or our later memories of them.” Schacter identifies five different types of biases. “Consistency and change biases show how our theories about ourselves can lead us to reconstruct the past as overly similar to, or different from, the present. Hindsight biases reveal that recollections of past events are filtered by current knowledge. Egocentric biases illustrate the powerful role of the self in orchestrating perceptions and memories of realty. And stereotypical biases demonstrate how generic memories shape interpretation of the world, even when we are unaware of their existence or influence.”<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/The%20Problem%20with%20memory%20III.docx#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Schacter argues that consistency bias changes one’s memory of past events to reflect how one currently is viewing a situation. If we have an opinion on a subject now, consistency bias makes us want to remember that we always had that opinion, even though in realty we didn’t. Change bias changes one’s memory of past events to make one think that their current state is better than it was in the past, when in fact it hasn’t changed. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Hindsight bias is the phenomena that people’s memories of what they were predicting change after an event happens. A common example is the prediction of how well a sports team will do in a big game or season. After the game or season, people’s memories of their predictions before the event tend to match with whatever occurred. If you predicted a win, and the team lost, you tend to remember that you predicted the team would lose. If you predicted a loss, and the team won, you tend to remember that you predicted the team would lose.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Egocentric biases involve remembering past experience in a way that casts oneself in a positive light. Schacter discusses research on “positive illusions” in which most people believe that they are above average in various personality traits. Of course we can’t all be above average, and therefore some of us suffer from “positive illusions.” </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Friedrich Nietzsche aptly conveys the meaning of egocentric bias <span class="apple-style-span"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;line-height:200%;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">in his aphorism: "I have done that, says my memory. I cannot have done that, says my pride, and remains adamant. At last, memory yields.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;line-height:200%;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman""><span class="Apple-style-span">Stereotype bias is when we remember past events in a way that is consistent with a stereotype of whatever it is that we are considering. If we think about a librarian, we may think about a woman with glasses that is quiet and introverted rather than an athletic extroverted male. When we remember a situation, we remember consistent with our stereotype, which then strengthens our stereotype. Schacter argues that this phenomena is also present in racism and sexism. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;line-height:200%;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman""><span class="Apple-style-span">The seventh sin of memory according to Schacter is the sin of persistence. Persistence involves remembering things you want to forget. An example is music that keeps running through one’s head. This sin is often the underpinning of depression as people can develop persistent memories of failure. It also underpins post-traumatic stress disorder.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;line-height:200%;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman""><span class="Apple-style-span">Schacter concludes his book by illustrating that his “seven sins” of memory could also be considered seven virtues of memories. Each of the sins has developed to allow humans to thrive.</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;line-height:200%;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman""><span class="Apple-style-span">The research on memory shows that human memory is not equivalent to recording a scene with a camera. The processes of memory make a remembrance a subjective impression of a past event--an approximation, with some memories being a more accurate approximations than others. I can recommend Schacter's book to anyone interested in memory.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p> <div><!--[if !supportEndnotes]--><span class="Apple-style-span"><br /></span><hr align="left" width="33%"> <!--[endif]--> <div id="edn1"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/The%20Problem%20with%20memory%20III.docx#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Schacter, Daniel L. (2001)<i> The Seven Sins of Memory, How the Mind Forgets and Remember,</i>N.Y., N.Y. p. 139</span></p> </div></div></div><span class="Apple-style-span">The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.</span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-22294975997654995132011-03-19T05:11:00.001-05:002011-03-19T05:12:56.562-05:00The Problem(s) with Memory - Part Two<div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">In my last entry, I discussed three of the seven “sins of memory” identified by Daniel L. Schacter, in his book, <i>The Seven Sins of Memory, How the Mind Forgets and Remembers</i>. I will now discuss two more sins—ones that threaten the certainty of recollections we hear coming from a witness stand.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">The fourth “sin of memory” is misattribution. Misattribution includes believing we remember things, that in fact, never occurred, and believing we are imagining things that we are actually remembering. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Schacter writes: “.. misattributions are surprisingly common. Sometimes we remember events that never happened, misattributing speedy processing of incoming information or vivid images that spring to mind, to memories of past events that did not occur. Sometimes we recall correctly what happened, but misattribute it to the wrong time or place. And at other times misattribution operates in a different direction: we mistakenly credit a spontaneous image or thought to our own imagination, when in reality we are recalling it—without awareness—from something we read or heard.”<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Problem%20with%20memory%20II%20(1).docx#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Examples of misattribution are déjà vu and erroneous eye witness identifications. Schacter discusses numerous examples of individuals falsely accused of crimes based on faulty eye witness identifications. He discusses the research on “unconscious transference” where one unconsciously transfers memory of an individual from one context to another, and binding failures where we incorrectly glue together various pieces of memory to create a fabricated memory.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">The fifth “sin of memory” is the sin of suggestibility. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Schacter writes: “Suggestibility in memory refers to an individual’s tendency to incorporate misleading information from external sources—other people, written materials or pictures, even the media—into personal recollections. Suggestibility is closely related to misattribution in the sense that the conversion of suggestions into inaccurate memories must involve misattribution. However, misattribution often occurs in the absence of overt suggestion, making suggestibility a distinct sin of memory.”<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Problem%20with%20memory%20II%20(1).docx#_edn2" name="_ednref2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">This sin of memory is also implicated in false eyewitness identifications through things such as show-ups or poorly conducted lineups. Further, Schacter reports research that casts considerable doubt on an eyewitness’s evaluation of their certainty of their identifications. Anyone who has defended someone on charges based on an eyewitness testimony knows its power on a jury, especially the eyewitness’s testimony that they are “certain” that the defendant was the person who committed the crime. The research Schacter references infers that a very uncertain identification can be transformed into a certain identification merely with the word “Okay” spoken by the officer administering the line-up.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">As a defense attorney, I was involved in an attempted homicide case that involved an issue of whether or not a knot would slip. I claimed that the knot would slip—which would help exonerate my client. The State argued that it would not slip. An investigator with the DA’s office and I took the knot to a Coast Guard Officer in Milwaukee. I was watching the officer play with knot. Unfortunately, the investigator had left the room for a minute. While the investigator was playing with the knot, the knot slipped. When the investigator came back into the room I told the investigator what happened. The investigator said to the officer: “It didn’t slip did it?” The officer immediately said, “No”. I couldn’t believe it. We went to trial. The knot slipped at trial, and my client was acquitted. I do not believe that the officer was lying. I believe that the officer’s memory was changed by the investigator’s suggestion that the knot did not slip.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Suggestibility also is implicated in false confessions. Certainly many false confessions are the result of outright coercion. But, as Schacter notes, a subset of these false confessions involve the confessors believing that they committed crimes that they actually didn’t commit. In his book, Schacter discusses individual cases involving false confessions and suggestibility.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Schacter further reports on the research regarding the suggestibility of interviews with young children. I understand this research is controversial as child victim advocates sometimes view this research as antithetical to protecting children and getting child molesters off the street. As a prosecutor I was extremely interested in this issue. It’s the reason I bought Schacter’s book, and started requiring recorded interviews by trained forensic interviewers. Anyone who has been involved with interviewing children knows the power of suggestibility—in both directions—from allegations to recanting of allegations. Anyone making decisions about other’s lives based on memories should know the research about suggestibility and be on guard for those factors that may influence memories.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%"><span class="Apple-style-span">I will continue my discussion of memory a future entry. As I will be involved in another project for the next several weeks, I probably won’t be back for a week or so.</span></p> <div><!--[if !supportEndnotes]--><span class="Apple-style-span"><br /> </span><hr align="left" width="33%"> <!--[endif]--> <div id="edn1"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Problem%20with%20memory%20II%20(1).docx#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Schacter, Daniel L. (2001)<i> The Seven Sins of Memory, How the Mind Forgets and Remember,</i>N.Y., N.Y. p. 90</span></p> </div> <div id="edn2"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Problem%20with%20memory%20II%20(1).docx#_ednref2" name="_edn2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Ibid. p. 113.</span></p> </div></div></div><span class="Apple-style-span">The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.</span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-77649342777551713412011-03-14T05:52:00.000-05:002011-03-14T06:00:55.791-05:00The Problem(s) with Memory<div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">Human memory is often central to decisions made in the court system. Witnesses testify based on their memories of their observations of various matters. How confident should one be in a human’s memory? How confident should one be in someone’s confidence of their memories? Let’s say that human memory is far from infallible. </p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">When I was a prosecutor, I handled most of the sexual assault cases. In many of those cases, the only direct evidence against a defendant was the victim’s memory of the assault. Many of the victims were children. I attempted to have the law enforcement agents who investigated these crimes consider the victim’s memory similar to a crime scene. I wanted to preserve the crime scene and prevent contamination of it until all of the evidence had been collected.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>I had trained interviewers complete videotaped forensic interviews of the victims. I insisted on taped statements from suspects and witnesses.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">I also read a book by Daniel L. Schacter, a professor of psychology at Harvard, entitled <i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal">The Seven Sins of Memory</i>.<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn1" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Human%20memory.docx#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi; mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Although published ten years ago, it still offers much about the research into memory. The book is arranged in chapters around what Dr. Schacter has called the seven sins of memory. I will touch on each of the sins.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">Schacter identifies the first sin of memory as transience which is forgetting things due to the passage of time.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>He writes: “Perhaps the most pervasive of memory’s sins, transience operates silently but continually: the past inexorably recedes with the occurrence of new experiences.” <span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>We forget things with time.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">The second sin of memory that Schacter identifies is absentmindedness. Absentmindedness is “lapses of attention that results in failing to remember information that was either never encoded properly (if at all) or is available in memory but overlooked at the time we need to retrieve it.”<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>Schacter believes absentmindedness is often the result of divided attention. You are thinking about something else so you are not remembering another thing. Anyone who has set his or her keys or glasses down, only to forget where, has experienced this sin.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">Schacter states the third sin of memory is blocking. Blocking occurs when the information that you are attempting to recall has been encoded in memory, but you don’t have the ability to recall it when desired. We all have had the experience of having something on “the tip of our tongue” but can’t seem to come up with it.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">These first three sins are mostly passive culprits in reducing the accuracy of the justice system. People forget, and therefore cannot tell us, what we want to know to make an accurate determination of past event. An honest statement from a witness of “I don’t remember” will often be considered as no evidence at all, providing no evidentiary weight in any direction. The sins that I address next week will be more pernicious in our quest for the truth.</p> <div style="mso-element:endnote-list"><!--[if !supportEndnotes]--><br /> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%"> <!--[endif]--> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn1"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn1" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Human%20memory.docx#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Schacter, Daniel L. 2001, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal">The Seven Sins of Memory, How the mind forgets and remembers</i>. Houghton Mifflin Co., N.Y., N.Y.</p> </div></div></span></div><span class="Apple-style-span" >The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.</span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-10446434442964251092011-03-07T05:42:00.003-06:002011-03-07T08:47:22.151-06:00Competing Ideas or Different Questions?<span class="Apple-style-span"><div><span class="Apple-style-span"><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><br /></p><div style="text-indent: 0px;"><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"> </span>Two recent Sunday editions of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel had opinion pieces that addressed the use of evidence-based strategies in addressing crime. The first article was written by Milwaukee County Sheriff, David A. Clarke, Jr.. See <a href="http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/116508233.html">Let's treat criminals like...criminals</a> .</div><p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">It is safe to say that Sheriff Clarke is highly skeptical of using researched-based strategies when making decisions within the criminal justice system. He believes that those who conduct and use such studies are either “academic elites,” “criminal sympathizers”, or “criminal advocates” (or a combination of the three) engaged in an attempt to “indoctrinate the public.” He ultimately believes that the best way to address crime is to reduce the cost of incarceration so that longer sentences are more affordable. The sheriff advocates locking criminals up for as long as possible in cheap, private prisons. The sheriff argues that the value of incarceration in terms of reduced victimization is not being fully considered by those advocating being “smart on crime.”</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">Milwaukee County District Attorney John Chisholm, and two Milwaukee County Judges, Jeffrey Kremers and Richard Sankovitz, responded to the sheriff in the following Sunday paper. See <a href="http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/116955003.html">Rely on the facts to fight crime</a> . They argue that “Decisions about how to correct offenders should be based on research and actual experience, not myth or anecdote or mere intuition.”<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>They further argue that “…we in the criminal justice system are stewards of limited resources; we are responsible for holding offenders accountable and protecting the community—but cost effectively, within what the community can afford.” </p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">The authors of each of the articles struggle with the central issues of crime and punishment in our society.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>First, we all can agree that crime is an economic drag on our society. In an ideal society, everyone would voluntarily follow the laws of society. In such society, we would no longer have the costs of victimization, the costs of law enforcement and the criminal justice system, and the costs of incarceration. Those societal resources could be used for such things as education and health care, or returned to the citizens to spend in anyway they desire. But we don’t live in this ideal society.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">Recently, we have heard much about Wisconsin having to be more competitive with other states. Can we be competitive with states, like Minnesota, that have similar crime rates but spend considerable less taxpayer money on incarceration? Are the people in Minnesota doing something that allows them to control crime at a lower cost than us? Or are Wisconsin people or Wisconsin communities more criminally inclined than Minnesota’s, so Wisconsin requires the expenditure of more resources to fight crime to obtain similar crime rates? If there are ways to provide the same level of community safety at lower costs, or more community safety at the same costs, shouldn’t decision makers explore those avenues?<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">The use of “evidence-based” strategies when making decisions within the criminal justice system is one such avenue. <span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>The sheriff favors long sentences because he correctly understands that incarceration, and therefore incapacitation, for the longest period of time possible is highly effective in reducing the risk that someone will re-offend over the period of time the person is incarcerated. Further, one can say with a high level of certainty that incapacitation will reduce recidivism for most everyone who is incarcerated. For all practical purposes, we don’t really have to be concerned about a population of offenders for which incapacitation doesn’t work. The implication is that the best strategy to maximize community safety is to incarcerate all offenders for the maximum period of time possible. The reduction in the probability that someone will re-offend reduces the expected costs of victimization which is the benefit of incarceration.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>I believe that is what the sheriff is arguing.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">However, the other issue that must be considered is the societal costs of the long periods of incarceration. We don’t live in a society where the costs don’t have to be considered. That is another ideal society that doesn’t exist—yet one we often like to pretend does. When a judge sentences someone to prison for ten years, in effect he or she is deciding to spend approximately $250,000 of taxpayers’ money with the hope that the society will gain at least $250,000 of community safety and other value from the expenditure. If ten people are sentenced to prison for ten years, the society will need to pay $2.5 million for incarceration costs. Sheriff Clarke understands that point, but argues that we should be trying to reduce the cost of incarceration—again a worthy goal.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">But what if five of the ten people that we send to prison for ten years would never re-offend again regardless of the sentence? If that is the case, we are spending $1.25 million dollars and getting no additional return to community safety for the expenditure. We are also unnecessarily losing that defendant’s output as a worker and member of a family and community. Wouldn’t it be wise to be able to try to identify the five individuals who wouldn’t reoffend regardless of their punishment, and not spend the $1.25 million to incarcerate them, but spend it somewhere else where it could benefit us? This identification process, of matching defendants with an appropriate sentence, and only using treatment that has been proven effective, is what using “evidence-based” practices is about. </p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">Everyone in the criminal justice system, including law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, and correctional professionals are required to make decisions about how best to handle individuals whom they believe have committed a crime. Currently, many of these decisions are based on folk-theory, custom, and erroneous intuitions. The use of empirically supported theories when making decisions has been shown, in fields such as medicine, to be a more effective strategy in obtaining desired goals than using the other, less effective strategies. </p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">Sheriff Clarke was clearly, and rightfully, upset by a convicted bank robber robbing another bank after being released from prison on some type of early release program. He called this program a “failed experiment”.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>We don’t know if this convict’s release was based on an evidenced-based assessment or not.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>But does the failure of one convict who participated in a program mean that the program has failed? It doesn’t, but it does exemplify a weakness in any risk-assessment approach—evidence-based or otherwise. Risk assessments can be wrong.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">Part of the “evidence-based” approach to crime uses scientifically validated risk-assessments of defendants to identify treatment needs and then match those needs with the sentence. For example, if a defendant has been identified, through the risk assessment, as a good candidate for probation and treatment, then he or she is placed on probation rather than sent to prison. If someone is identified as a continued threat to society, that person is sent to prison. The weakness is that the identification of high and low risk offenders by using a risk assessment instrument is far from accurate.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">The research underlying any risk-assessment uses group averages with confidence intervals. The research allows one to say that for a group of individuals, one can be 95% confident that the proportion of individuals who will recidivate will fall within the upper and lower limits of the confidence interval. (See for example, Hart, Stephen D., Christine Mitchie, and David J. Cooke, (2007), “Precision of actuarial risk assessment instruments. <span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>Evaluating the ‘margins of error’ of group v. individual predictions of violence” <i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal">British Journal of Psychiatry</i>, 190 (suppl. 49) pp. s60-65.)</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>However, when evaluating a single person a different question is asked. For example, if a defendant takes Risk Assessment A and has a score of 10, one can say that we are 95% certain that people with a score of 10, the probability that such a person will recidivate is between an upper and lower limit. The problem is that these limits are quite wide, and much wider than the group confidence intervals. The prediction equation is nothing more than an average value one would observe over many replications, with a high level of risk of being wrong for any one individual.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">Therefore, unlike a policy of incarcerating everyone, where we know incapacitation will without a doubt prevent recidivism, a risk assessment will on the average be correct, but will, at times, be wrong. The use of the risk assessment will help identify some of the people who would not recidivate regardless of sentence, but will also erroneously identify some defendants as non-recidivists when in fact they will recidivate and will erroneously identify some defendants as recidivists when they will not recidivate. </p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%">Does that make these evidence-based risk assessments useless? Negative. Currently, police officers, prosecutors, judges, probation agents, and correctional professionals make assessments regarding whether or not a particular defendant will re-offend. These assessments drive the decisions on whether to arrest and prosecute, as to what sentence to impose, or whether a defendant shall be released from prison early. The use of “evidence-based” information will help these professionals make better decisions. The research shows that using a risk-assessment instrument increases the accuracy of predictions over predictions based solely on unguided personal judgment. We all know that some of the decisions that will be made will be wrong, as they are now, but these tools, developed and used appropriately (I share the sheriff’s concerns about the system’s ability to separate solid research from hype) will help us become more accurate. The increased accuracy, in turn, will increase community safety, not decrease it, and also preserve taxpayer dollars.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><o:p> </o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><o:p> </o:p></p></span></div>The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.</span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-28673955450417468882011-02-28T05:52:00.000-06:002011-02-28T05:53:07.226-06:00The Fundamental Attribution Error<div><span class="Apple-style-span" ><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in">The legal system often ascribes and apportions blame. Decisions are made about whether someone was at fault in an accident, or whether a defendant is guilty. We assume that the actor’s action was primarily the result of a quality of the actor and not merely the by-product of the circumstances in which the actor found himself. The law looks for “a” cause not “the” cause of an event. <span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>At other times, we are more willing to excuse otherwise inexcusable behavior when extraordinary circumstances are present such as with the defenses of coercion, necessity, and self-defense.</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count:1"> </span>One error in thinking is when we “explain other’s behavior as resulting predominately from their personality, while we often minimize (or even ignore) the importance of the particular situations in which they find themselves.”<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn1" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Fundamental%20Attribution%20Error.docx#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi; mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> This prevalent, but mistaken, tendency has been called “the fundamental attribution error.”<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn2" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Fundamental%20Attribution%20Error.docx#_edn2" name="_ednref2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language: EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> For example, if we observe someone not contributing to a worthy charity, we think of them of stingy, but we don’t consider that may have recently just given money to another charity, and have bills to pay.</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count:1"> </span>The fundamental attribution error is often reversed when someone explains their own behavior. People have the tendency to explain their own behavior in terms of the situation they had found themselves in, rather than in terms of their own dispositions.<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn3" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Fundamental%20Attribution%20Error.docx#_edn3" name="_ednref3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language: EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA">[iii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Why does the fundamental attribution error exist? Researchers have identified two sources for this error.</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count:1"> </span>The first is the cognitive bias that we are attractive to those things that are the most perceptually salient and equate perceptually salient stimuli with casual stimuli.<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn4" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Fundamental%20Attribution%20Error.docx#_edn4" name="_ednref4" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi; mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA">[iv]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> When we consider what another person has done, our attention focuses on the person and we have the tendency to ascribe the person’s behavior to qualities of the person. When we think of ourselves, the most salient stimuli are the situational factors we are facing, and then we ascribe causation of any of our behavior to these situational factors. </p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count:1"> </span>Another potential cause of the fundamental attribution error is the motivational biases that satisfy our “desire for self-esteem, power, or prestige.”<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn5" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Fundamental%20Attribution%20Error.docx#_edn5" name="_ednref5" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi; mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA">[v]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> People in our culture believe that we are in control of our own destiny, and that makes us feel better. “After all, if we assume that other people have control over their outcomes, it reassures us that we, too, can control our outcomes.”<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn6" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Fundamental%20Attribution%20Error.docx#_edn6" name="_ednref6" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi; mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA">[vi]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> </p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in">This tendency gives us the “illusion of control.” We want to believe that bad things happen because bad people do bad things, and good things happen because good people do good things. We don’t want to believe, that life, many times, isn’t fair. Bad things happen to good people and good things happen to bad people. The understanding of this tension in our thought process is at least as old as the Book of Job.</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count:1"> </span>Research into assigning blame for an accident involved aspects of the fundamental attribution error. A researcher had people ascribe blame to the owner of a car who parked his car on a hill. The brake did not hold the vehicle and the parked car rolled down a hill. The first situation had the car hitting a tree causing no damage to anyone. In the second situation, the vehicle struck another vehicle causing minimal damage. In the third situation, the vehicle struck a shop, injuring a shopkeeper and child.<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn7" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Fundamental%20Attribution%20Error.docx#_edn7" name="_ednref7" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi; mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA">[vii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> </p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count:1"> </span>Little blame was ascribed to the car owner when the vehicle caused no damage or slight damage. However, when the car caused harm to the shopkeeper and child, the people wanted the person punished.<a style="mso-endnote-id:edn8" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Fundamental%20Attribution%20Error.docx#_edn8" name="_ednref8" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character:footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi; mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA">[viii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> People feel better when someone can be blamed for behavior that results in harm. The punishment reinforces the idea that bad things do not happen randomly, but happen because people do bad things and not because good people are placed in bad situations that cause bad things. Anyone who has ever been involved in a sentencing for a negligent homicide has experienced examples of this human tendency. </p> <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p> <div style="mso-element:endnote-list"><!--[if !supportEndnotes]--><br /> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%"> <!--[endif]--> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn1"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn1" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Fundamental%20Attribution%20Error.docx#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Levy, David A., <i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal">Tools of Critical Thinking, Metathoughts for Psychology</i>, 1997, Long Grove, Ill: Waveland Press Inc. P. 84.</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn2"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn2" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Fundamental%20Attribution%20Error.docx#_ednref2" name="_edn2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Roos, L. (1977), “The Intuitive Psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process.” <i style="mso-bidi-font-style:normal">Advances in expermimental social psychology </i>(Vol. 10), New York: Academic Press.</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn3"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn3" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Fundamental%20Attribution%20Error.docx#_ednref3" name="_edn3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">[iii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Levy, David, 1997, p. 86.</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn4"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn4" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Fundamental%20Attribution%20Error.docx#_ednref4" name="_edn4" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">[iv]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Ibid. p. 86</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn5"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn5" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Fundamental%20Attribution%20Error.docx#_ednref5" name="_edn5" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">[v]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Ibid. p. 87</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn6"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn6" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Fundamental%20Attribution%20Error.docx#_ednref6" name="_edn6" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">[vi]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Ibid. p. 87</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn7"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn7" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Fundamental%20Attribution%20Error.docx#_ednref7" name="_edn7" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">[vii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Walster, E. (1966) “Assignment of responsibility for an accident.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3, 73-79.</p> </div> <div style="mso-element:endnote" id="edn8"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><a style="mso-endnote-id:edn8" href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/The%20Fundamental%20Attribution%20Error.docx#_ednref8" name="_edn8" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">[viii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Ibid.</p> </div></div></span></div><span class="Apple-style-span" >The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.</span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-67840568353376228922011-02-21T07:00:00.002-06:002011-02-22T20:12:40.330-06:00Anchoring and Adjustment<div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span">When I was a defense attorney I couldn’t help but notice how sentences for similar crimes and similar defendants were often different in different counties regardless of judges. There appeared to be different cultures of understanding among counties as to what level of punishment was appropriate for different crimes. Prosecutors in some counties recommend more punitive sentences than prosecutors in other counties for similar crimes and similar defendants. Judges, keying off of the harsher recommendations, punished more severely than judges in other counties for similar crimes for similar defendants. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span">But even within counties, I also believed that punishment would often vary depending on the prosecutor’s recommendation. The prosecutor’s recommendation was important. If I had a prosecutor that would recommend a lenient sentence, then it was more likely (but not certain) that the defendant would receive a comparatively lenient sentence. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Why is a prosecutor’s recommendation a factor in a judge’s sentencing decision? First, a good prosecutor will use the same sentencing factors that a judge uses to recommend the sentence. Both the prosecutor and the judge may independently arrive at the conclusion that a certain sentence is fair. Secondly, the sentencing judge may be giving some deference to a plea agreement between the parties, so that the plea bargaining process maintains some vitality.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span">But I believe that what is also occurring is part of the psychological phenomenon called anchoring and adjustment. The prosecutor’s recommendation and the defense attorney’s recommendation operate as an “anchor” in the judge’s sentencing decision. An “anchor” is a starting value from which a decision is made.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Anchoring%20and%20Adjustment.docx#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span"> In one study, real estate agents were given all the information that agents required for an appraisal of a residential property, including such things as comparables, etc.. The agents were all allowed to view the entire property, and were asked to appraise the property to ascertain a listing price. The only difference in the appraisal packets was that there were different listing prices written on one of the sheets given to the agents. Some listing prices were high and some were low. The listing price was not a variable that should be used in the appraisal of the property, as the appraisal was to set the listing price, and not the reverse.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span">The results of the research showed that those agents who had packets with higher listing prices appraised the property at higher prices than those with lower listing prices. The agent’s appraisals became anchored by whatever listing price they had seen.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Anchoring%20and%20Adjustment.docx#_edn2" name="_ednref2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span">This anchoring effect is present even when people estimate an answer. One study had participants in front of a “wheel of fortune” and spun the wheel. If the wheel landed on a 65, the experimenter asked, “Is the percentage of African countries in the U.N. greater or less than 65%? The participants answers and then is asked: “Exactly what percentage of African countries are in the U.N.” </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Another, participant spun the wheel and it landed on 10. The experimenter asked: “Is the percentage of African countries in the U.N. greater or less than 10%? The participants answered and then was asked: “Exactly what percentage of African countries are in the U.N.” The experimenters found that the answers to the second question were highly correlated to the percentage used in the first question. Subjects that had a high percentage in the first question, provided a high answer on the second question. Subjects that had a low percentage in the first question, provided a low answer on the second. The subjects had been anchored by the first number.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Anchoring%20and%20Adjustment.docx#_edn3" name="_ednref3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[iii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Research has shown that anchoring effect may also affect the way juries decide criminal verdicts which involve lesser included offenses. Researchers evaluated the order of questions on a criminal verdict using mock jurors. The research showed that verdicts that have the jury consider the most serious offense first and then the lesser included offenses, like those used in Wisconsin, would result in a higher probability of a conviction on the most serious offense than if the verdict would have the lesser included offenses listed first, and then proceed up to the more serious offense.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Anchoring%20and%20Adjustment.docx#_edn4" name="_ednref4" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[iv]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> This research, which I don’t know has been replicated, certainly raises serious and interesting questions about protecting against anchoring effects in jury decisions.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span></p> <div><!--[if !supportEndnotes]--><span class="Apple-style-span"><br /> </span><hr align="left" width="33%"> <!--[endif]--> <div id="edn1"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Anchoring%20and%20Adjustment.docx#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Plous, Scott, 1993, <i>The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making</i>, McGraw Hill, p. 145.</span></p> </div> <div id="edn2"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Anchoring%20and%20Adjustment.docx#_ednref2" name="_edn2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Northcraft, George B., and Margaret A Neale, (1987), Experts, Ameteurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring and Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39, 84-97.</span></p> </div> <div id="edn3"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Anchoring%20and%20Adjustment.docx#_ednref3" name="_edn3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[iii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Plous (1993) above p. 145</span></p> </div> <div id="edn4"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Anchoring%20and%20Adjustment.docx#_ednref4" name="_edn4" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[iv]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Greenberg, Jeff, Kipling D. Williams and Mary K. O’Brien, (1986) Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 1 41-50.</span></p> </div></div></div><span class="Apple-style-span">The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.</span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-78396284585729336262011-02-14T06:11:00.002-06:002011-02-14T06:44:55.334-06:00Erroneous Cost Benefit Analysis of Criminal Justice Programs<div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span">The large budget deficits facing both the State of Wisconsin and the federal government will undoubtedly result in reductions in the budgets of many government programs. Some in government are attempting to integrate basic market principles directly into the construction of government programs. For example, grant programs that use investment principles. See <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/business/economy/09leonhardt.html?hp">For Federal Programs, a Taste of Market Discipline</a> .</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Many in government are attempting to evaluate the results of their efforts—to assess the benefits of the program to allow comparison with the costs. The political fight over the funding for government programs often involves attempting to determine which programs have benefits that exceed their costs. A large part of the push for “evidence-based” evaluation of criminal justice programs is to ascertain whether the benefits of a government program exceed its costs. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Those of us in leadership positions within government service have the responsibility to ensure that our program evaluations are legitimate and intellectually rigorous, and not merely a sophistic justification of a favorite program. Incorrect information to guide policy decisions is worse than no information. I would rather drive a car that I know doesn’t have a speedometer than one that I don’t know has a defective speedometer. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span">I have recently listened to and read reports of evaluations of criminal justice programs that don’t stand-up to basic program evaluation techniques. One glaring error is evaluating the worth of a treatment court in terms of the value of the reduction in the number of days of jail defendants in the program receive over the number of days jail defendants not in the program receive. This comparison is erroneous.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span">The false comparison goes like this. The cost to the county to house someone in jail is $65 per day. If someone is sentenced under the treatment court program, they get, for example, 10 days in jail, and if they successfully complete treatment court, they don’t have to spend any additional time in jail. If someone does not successfully complete treatment court, they are then sentenced to an additional 100 days in jail. Therefore, the treatment court saves the county 100 days in jail for every defendant who successfully completes treatment court. At a cost of $65.00 per day of jail, the county saves $6,500 for the 100 days. This $6,500 is then compared against the cost of the treatment court, (let’s assume $2,500 per participant) to come to the erroneous conclusion that the benefits of the treatment court are greater than the costs of the treatment court. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span">Here is why this is an erroneous comparison. The calculated benefits of the treatment court are not the result of the treatment the defendants obtained by participating in the treatment court, but rather a result of a reduction in the jail sentence that has also been added as a component of the treatment court program. A second variable has been introduced. An accurate analysis would be to compare the costs and benefits of 10 days in jail without treatment court with 10 days in jail with treatment (or 110 days in jail with treatment court with just 110 days in jail). </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span">The reduced jail costs are not the result of a reduction in new crimes that result in fewer days of incarceration due to participation in treatment court. The reduced jail costs are merely the result of eliminating 100 days of jail treatment as part of the treatment regiment. As</span> most of the research on the deterrent value of incarceration shows that an extra 100 days in jail will do very little to reduce recidivism regardless of participation in any other program, the most efficient strategy may be to just eliminate the extra 100 days of jail and move on, or to use the conventional strategies of deferred prosecution agreements or probation to ensure treatment rather than use a more resource intensive treatment court.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span"> If a treatment court is found statistically effective in reducing recidivism, is this reduction the result of the treatment alone or is the court component, beyond coercing treatment, a significant operant variable? If the court component is a significant operant variable, what is it about the court component that makes it so? How could that component be delivered most efficiently? Those questions have not yet been answered by the research, and the erroneous comparison certainly does nothing to answer any of them. </span></p></div><span class="Apple-style-span">The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.</span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-46700583008593137652011-02-07T06:11:00.000-06:002011-02-07T06:12:32.728-06:00Errors in Group Decision Making<div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >In our society, many consequential decisions are group decisions. Group decisions are subject to many of the same possible errors in the decision making process as individual decisions. An effective group decision will hopefully be a better decision than an individual decision. Haven’t we always been taught that: “Two heads are better than one”? </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >However, the research shows that group decisions are often worse than individual decisions. One of the culprits that contribute to this phenomenon is “groupthink”. Groupthink is the term for the tendency of a group to make an erroneous decision due to group loyalty and social cohesion. <a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Errors%20in%20Group%20Decision%20Making.docx#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >Examples of decisions made through groupthink are President Kennedy’s Bay of Pigs decision, President Johnson’s decision to escalate the Vietnam War, and President Nixon’s Watergate decisions.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Errors%20in%20Group%20Decision%20Making.docx#_edn2" name="_ednref2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> The decision to launch the space shuttle Challenger during cold weather, resulting in its demise, has also been identified as an example of groupthink.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Errors%20in%20Group%20Decision%20Making.docx#_edn3" name="_ednref3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[iii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >Janis (1982) identified three major causes of group think. The first is overestimation of the group. The group thinks of itself as more righteous, more intelligent, or more powerful than others resulting in overconfidence. The second major cause is closed-mindedness of the group as the group rationalizes away any challenges to their thoughts. Outsiders (those not considered part of the group) with other views are dismissed as inferior and not worthy of regard. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >The third major cause is groupthink is group pressures for uniformity. Individuals self-censor any of their concerns or dissenting views to maintain group uniformity. The individuals do not want to stray from the prevailing view of the group. Although there may be individuals who harbor concerns or dissenting views, there exists a shared illusion of unanimity. Dissenters are pressured to conform to the view of the group. Within the group, may exist a self-appointed “mind-guard” who keeps information that may challenge the group’s decision from the group.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Errors%20in%20Group%20Decision%20Making.docx#_edn4" name="_ednref4" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[iv]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >Preventing groupthink requires a group leader than encourages dissent and criticism.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Errors%20in%20Group%20Decision%20Making.docx#_edn5" name="_ednref5" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[v]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Many in society have been taught that we all should get-along with others, and they are not comfortable being involved with what can sometimes be a bit of rancor during a clash of ideas. But constructive dissent and criticism, not involving ad hominem attacks, are essential to making any good decision. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >Group leaders should not state their preferences early in any discussion.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Errors%20in%20Group%20Decision%20Making.docx#_edn6" name="_ednref6" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[vi]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> The statement of a preference of a group leader, especially if the group leader is considered an authority, is a sure way to stifle dissent and criticism. Most people will not see any benefit to them in questioning the idea of the leader. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >Multiple groups can be set up to make the same decision and then the groups can have a more open discussion of any differing ideas. Group members can discuss the deliberations of the groups with others, and then share those conversations with the group. Also, groups can ask outside experts or others to attend the group meeting and provide input to counter the insularity of the decision making process. Finally, a devil’s advocate should be appointed whose role is to challenge the groups ideas—an especially effective procedure.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Errors%20in%20Group%20Decision%20Making.docx#_edn7" name="_ednref7" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[vii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span" >I have been involved in groups throughout my lifetime, and rarely has a group not exhibited aspects of groupthink. Groupthink may not make much difference in a decision involving where to hold the group’s annual banquet, but can lead to catastrophic failure in more important decisions.</span></p> <div><!--[if !supportEndnotes]--><span class="Apple-style-span" ><br /> </span><hr align="left" width="33%"> <!--[endif]--> <div id="edn1"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span" ><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Errors%20in%20Group%20Decision%20Making.docx#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Janis, I.L. (1982), <i>Victims of Groupthink</i> (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.) Boston. Houghton Mifflin.</span></p> </div> <div id="edn2"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span" ><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Errors%20in%20Group%20Decision%20Making.docx#_ednref2" name="_edn2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Ibid. </span></p> </div> <div id="edn3"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span" ><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Errors%20in%20Group%20Decision%20Making.docx#_ednref3" name="_edn3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[iii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Esser, J.K. & Lindoerfer, J.S. (1989). Groupthinkand the space shuttle Challenger Accident: Toward a quantitative case analysis. <i>Journal of Behavioral Decision Making</i>, 2, 167-77.</span></p> </div> <div id="edn4"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span" ><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Errors%20in%20Group%20Decision%20Making.docx#_ednref4" name="_edn4" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[iv]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Baron, Jonathan, 2008, <i>Thinking and Deciding, 4<sup>th</sup> Ed.</i>,, NY, Cambridge University Press, p.225;Plous, Scott, 1993, <i>The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making</i>, N.Y. McGraw Hill., p. 203.</span></p> </div> <div id="edn5"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span" ><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Errors%20in%20Group%20Decision%20Making.docx#_ednref5" name="_edn5" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[v]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Ibid. p. 203</span></p> </div> <div id="edn6"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span" ><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Errors%20in%20Group%20Decision%20Making.docx#_ednref6" name="_edn6" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[vi]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Ibid. p. 204.</span></p> </div> <div id="edn7"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span" ><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/Errors%20in%20Group%20Decision%20Making.docx#_ednref7" name="_edn7" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; ">[vii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Ibid. p. 205.</span></p> </div></div></div><span class="Apple-style-span" >The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.</span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7314653621970221313.post-78599155627231094002011-01-31T06:39:00.002-06:002011-01-31T06:47:03.372-06:00Irrational Persistence of Belief<div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black"><span class="Apple-style-span">Humans have a tremendous capacity to resolve conflicting and competing thoughts and evidence. When watching individuals confess to crimes and then later attempt to explain away both the evidence against them and the confession, I can’t help but be reminded of what Nietzsche once wrote: "I have done that, says my memory. I cannot have done that, says my pride, and remains adamant. At last, memory yields.” <o:p></o:p></span></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black"><span class="Apple-style-span">Human beings have the ability to distort their views of reality in the direction that fulfills their desires. The tendency for people to not look for evidence that disfavors one’s preconceived ideas, and if they find evidence that disfavors their preconceived ideas, the tendency to find a way to disregard it, is part of confirmation bias as discussed in an earlier blog entry.<o:p></o:p></span></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black"><span class="Apple-style-span">Researchers have shown that people maintain incorrect beliefs about things despite overwhelming evidence showing that their beliefs are incorrect. This tendency is called irrational persistence of belief. <o:p></o:p></span></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span"><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; color:black"> Researchers have stated: “The irrational persistence of belief is one of the major sources of human folly, as many have noted. We tend to hold to our beliefs without sufficient regard to the evidence against them or the lack of evidence in their favor.”</span></span><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Irrational%20persistence%20of%20belief.docx#_edn1" name="_ednref1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; color:black"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; color: black; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span"><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; color:black"> We have all explained the evidence and arguments against someone’s position, and then have heard the person say, “Whatever, I still believe my position is correct.” Irrational persistence of belief is combated by remaining open to counter-evidence and criticism of one’s ideas, including being able and willing to do self-critiques of one’s ideas—and then changing one’s position, if warranted. Rigid defensiveness about one’s ideas should signal a possible irrational belief.</span></span><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Irrational%20persistence%20of%20belief.docx#_edn2" name="_ednref2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;line-height: 150%;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; color: black; ">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black"> <o:p></o:p></span></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height:150%"><span class="Apple-style-span"><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; color:black"> One of the determinants of irrational persistence of belief relates to how people think about how they should think. Some beliefs about thinking lead to poor decision-making, such as the belief that changing one’s mind is a symptom of weakness.</span></span><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Irrational%20persistence%20of%20belief.docx#_edn3" name="_ednref3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; color:black"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; color: black; ">[iii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black"> Flip-flopping on an issue because it is politically expedient to do so is one thing. Changing one’s mind in light of new evidence, or in light of a better understanding of the evidence, is a whole other thing. Maintaining a steadfast opinion, regardless of its wrongfulness, is not a virtue; but is a sign of poor thinking. <o:p></o:p></span></span></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent:.5in;line-height:150%"><span class="apple-style-span"><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black"><span class="Apple-style-span">Decisions makers should attempt to be open to all sides of an argument, and to be aware of our tendency to want to continue to believe in our already formed opinions—regardless of the evidence against them. We need to fight our desire for not wanting to be confused by the facts.<o:p></o:p></span></span></span></p> <div><!--[if !supportEndnotes]--><span class="Apple-style-span"><br /> </span><hr align="left" width="33%"> <!--[endif]--> <div id="edn1"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Irrational%20persistence%20of%20belief.docx#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">[i]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Baron, Jonathan, 2008, <i>Thinking and Deciding</i>, Cambridge University Press, New York, New York, p. 203.</span></p> </div> <div id="edn2"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Irrational%20persistence%20of%20belief.docx#_ednref2" name="_edn2" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">[ii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Ibid. p. 203.</span></p> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><o:p><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span></o:p></p> </div> <div id="edn3"> <p class="MsoEndnoteText"><span class="Apple-style-span"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/Blog/Irrational%20persistence%20of%20belief.docx#_ednref3" name="_edn3" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="line-height: 115%; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; ">[iii]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Ibid. p. 213.</span></p> </div></div></div><span class="Apple-style-span">The views expressed in this blog are solely the views of the author(s) and do not represent the views of any other public official or organization.</span>Steven Bauerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09588942270739308611noreply@blogger.com0